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Pollution and the Bargaining Game
https://konan-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2318
https://konan-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2318b4f3ad6b-03cb-4ea4-9e25-9094904a17cd
| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2017-05-01 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Pollution and the Bargaining Game | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Pollution and the Bargaining Game | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題 | Pollutions | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題 | Bargaining Game | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題 | Transfer | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題 | Compensation | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||
| アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
| 著者 |
島本, 憲一
× 島本, 憲一× Shimamoto , Kenichi |
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| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Economic activities continue to expand and social concern on the environment and the impact of pollutants on the region continues to grow. Hence, the need to focus on sustainable development and find an optimal solution between polluters and the surrounding region through bilateral negotiations. This article uses the general function bargaining game to examine the optimal solution when considering the polluters' economic activity and environmental performance. As a result, under no environmental regulations, Pareto optimal is achieved by the surrounding region accepting the transfer of pollution from the polluters. Moreover, the amount of the transfer depends on the difference between the pollution reduction costs at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the pollution reduction costs under no environmental regulations and the difference between the benefits to the surrounding residents at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the benefits to the surrounding residents under no environmental regulations. On the other hand, under strict environmental regulations, Pareto optimal is achieved by polluters compensating the surrounding residents. Moreover, the amount of compensation depends on the difference between the pollution reduction costs at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the pollution reduction costs under strict environmental regulations and the difference between the benefits to the surrounding residents at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the benefits to the surrounding residents under strict environmental regulations. |
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| 書誌情報 |
Hirao School of Management review en : Hirao School of Management review 巻 7, p. 11-20, 発行日 2017-03-30 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 甲南大学マネジメント創造学部HSMR編集委員会 | |||||
| ISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 21860165 | |||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA12529030 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
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Cite as
島本, 憲一, Shimamoto , Kenichi , 2017, Pollution and the Bargaining Game: 甲南大学マネジメント創造学部HSMR編集委員会 , 11–20 p.
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