{"created":"2023-05-15T14:43:27.026500+00:00","id":2318,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"9b599784-d391-4d67-82e6-2161831155c6"},"_deposit":{"created_by":20,"id":"2318","owners":[20],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"2318"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:konan-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002318","sets":["10:235:336"]},"author_link":["3885","3886"],"item_10002_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2017-03-30","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"20","bibliographicPageStart":"11","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"7","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"Hirao School of Management review "},{"bibliographic_title":"Hirao School of Management review ","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_10002_description_19":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf ","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10002_description_5":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Economic activities continue to expand and social concern on the environment and the impact of pollutants on the region continues to grow. Hence, the need to focus on sustainable development and find an optimal solution between polluters and the surrounding region through bilateral negotiations. This article uses the general function bargaining game to examine the optimal solution when considering the polluters' economic activity and environmental performance. As a result, under no environmental regulations, Pareto optimal is achieved by the surrounding region accepting the transfer of pollution from the polluters. Moreover, the amount of the transfer depends on the difference between the pollution reduction costs at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the pollution reduction costs under no\nenvironmental regulations and the difference between the benefits to the surrounding residents at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the benefits to the surrounding residents under no environmental regulations. On the other hand, under strict environmental regulations, Pareto optimal is achieved by polluters compensating the surrounding residents. Moreover, the amount of compensation depends on the difference between the pollution reduction costs at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the pollution reduction costs under strict environmental regulations and the difference between the benefits to the surrounding residents at the polluters' optimal rate of pollution reduction and the benefits to the surrounding residents under strict environmental regulations.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_10002_publisher_8":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"甲南大学マネジメント創造学部HSMR編集委員会 "}]},"item_10002_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA12529030 ","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10002_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"21860165 ","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_10002_version_type_20":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_access_right":{"attribute_name":"アクセス権","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_access_right":"metadata only access","subitem_access_right_uri":"http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"島本, 憲一"},{"creatorName":"シマモト, ケンイチ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"3885","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Shimamoto , Kenichi ","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"3886","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Pollutions","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Bargaining Game","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Transfer","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Compensation","subitem_subject_language":"en","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Pollution and the Bargaining Game","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Pollution and the Bargaining Game"},{"subitem_title":"Pollution and the Bargaining Game","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10002","owner":"20","path":["336"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-05-01"},"publish_date":"2017-05-01","publish_status":"0","recid":"2318","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Pollution and the Bargaining Game"],"weko_creator_id":"20","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-05-16T05:29:00.631875+00:00"}