

A Semantico-Pragmatic Analysis of Performative Utterances, Part I

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0. Introduction

Performative sentences are of particular interest to both semantics and pragmatics because, though their form is declarative, they are used to perform actions named by their verbs, rather than to make assertions as declarative sentences usually do.¹ Consider the following sentences:

- (1) a. I order you to leave here.
- b. I promise that I will be there tomorrow.
- c. I apologize.
- d. I state that I did not see his wife.

For example, the utterance of sentence (1a) in an appropriate context constitutes the making of an order, rather than the statement of a fact. That is, when I utter sentence (1a), I am actually making an order, not stating a fact. Also, when I utter (1b), I am actually making a promise; when I utter (1c), I am simply apologizing; when I utter (1d), I am making the statement that I did not see his wife, but not the one that I state that I did not see his wife. Here the problem arises how the saying constitutes the doing: How is it possible that I can perform the action named by, for example, the verb *order* just by uttering “I order you to leave here.” The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of identifying both semantic and pragmatic properties that characterize performative utterances and then to solve this basic prob-

1 For this point, see Austin (1962). He was the first to point out that there are declarative sentences which do not state anything at all and cannot be true or false.

lem of performative utterances.²

There have been basically two accounts proposed to solve the problem. One treats a performative utterance as a statement to the effect that the speaker is performing the act named by the performative verb and then derives the performed illocutionary act by an inferential process usually associated with indirect speech acts. The process is like this: In uttering, “I order you to leave here,” the speaker is stating that he is ordering me to leave here, and presumably, he is speaking the truth, therefore, in stating that he is ordering me to leave here, he is ordering to leave here. However, this inference is not adequate, because the fact that the act of ordering is performed is both logically and epistemically prior to the truth of the statement; that is, before you can decide whether the statement is true or not, it must be determined whether a state of affairs in which the speaker is performing an act of ordering holds or not. Therefore the fact that the utterance of (1a) counts as an order cannot be due to its being a statement.³

On the other account, every successful performative utterance constitutes the illocutionary act named by its verb by way of its primarily being a declaration. For example, by a performative utterance “I promise that I will be there tomorrow,” the speaker derivatively promises the addressee by way of primarily declaring that he makes a promise. As Grewendorf (2002: 36-37) points out, this account allows the performative preface *I declare* to be recursively added to a performative utterance. That is, I can say:

(2) I (hereby) declare that I (hereby) order you to leave here.

And then:

2 This topic is discussed in detail by Grewendorf (2002), Harnish (2002), Jary (2007) and Searle (1989) and many others. My discussion owes much to Grewendorf (2002) and Searle (1989).

3 Lyons (1977: 742) also argues that ‘the performative use of *I promise* is logically, if not historically, prior to the descriptive use of the verb ‘to promise’ and that the token-reflexivity of particular utterances of *I (hereby) promise...* is a secondary consequence of this fact.’

- (3) I (hereby) declare that I (hereby) declare that I (hereby) order you to leave.

And so on *ad infinitum*. Also, the addition of *I declare* is semantically 'neutral or 'transparent.'⁴ In (2), for example, a declaration and a promise are simultaneously performed, but the former just emphasizes the latter, to say the least.

In what follows, I will offer a new explanation of how performative utterances work. My basic idea is that there are two ways in which they work; one is socio-pragmatic and the other is semantic.

1. Declaratory performative utterances

In this section, I will investigate how declarations like those in (4) constitute the acts named by their verbs.

- (4) a. I declare the meeting adjourned.
 b. I pronounce you man and wife.
 c. I name this ship the battleship Missouri.

According to Searle, they differ from linguistic performatives like those in (1) in that they require an extra-linguistic institution in order to be successfully performed and that, solely due to their successful performance, they create new non-linguistic facts such as an adjournment and a marriage. My claim is that declarations are a case of our basic language use of making the world correspond to our words. In what follows, I would like to show how it is supported.

Performative sentences like those in (1) and (4) are of the grammatical formula shown in (5); that is, the formula contains a first person singular subject, a speech act verb in the simple present tense, and sometimes an optional direct or indirect object, a complement or adjunct of some sort :

- (5) I (hereby) verb-present...

4 For this point, see Rutherford (1970 : 103). In this connection, I will discuss the role of the prefix *I declare* in detail in section 3.

This simple present tense is similar to the one used in sports commentaries and cooking demonstrations, whose examples are given in (6):

- (6) a. John passes the ball to Pete, who heads it straight into the goal!
 b. Now I put the cake-mixture into this bowl and add a drop of vanilla essence.

In example (6a), the speaker is describing what is happening immediately before him and the present tense indicates that the described event is simultaneous with his uttering the sentence. In situation-semantics terms, the coordinate of the space-time location l_u in the utterance situation u is the same as that of the space-time location l_d in the described situation d , as illustrated in (7):

- (7)
- $$U = [s \mid s \models \langle \text{uttering, sp, } \textit{John passes the ball to Pete, l} \rangle]$$
- $$D = [s \mid s \models \langle \text{passing-the ball-to, j, p, l} \rangle]$$
- $$u \models \langle \text{uttering, sp, } \textit{John passes the ball to Pete, l}_u \rangle$$
- $$d \models \langle \text{passing-the ball-to, j, p, l}_d \rangle,$$
- where $\text{time}(l_u) = \text{time}(l_d)$ (Time(l) is the time coordinate of space-time location l .)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U & \Rightarrow & D \\ \uparrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d \end{array}$$

Here the utterance situation u , an instance of the utterance situation type U , represents the described situation type D by virtue of the constraint ' $U \Rightarrow D$,' and D in turn instantiates the described situation d .

Also, in example (6b), the speaker's action coincides with his utterance:

- (7)
- $$U = [s \mid s \models \langle \text{uttering, sp, } \textit{I put the cake-mixture into this bowl, l} \rangle]$$
- $$B = [s \mid s \models \langle \text{putting-into-this-bowl, j, p, l} \rangle]$$
- $$u \models \langle \text{uttering, sp, } \textit{I put the cake-mixture into this bowl, l}_u \rangle$$

$b \models \langle \text{putting-into-this-bowl, sp, c, } l_b \rangle$

$\text{time}(l_u) = \text{time}(l_b)$

U	\Rightarrow	B
\uparrow		\uparrow
u	\rightarrow	b

Namely the speaker is performing his action in unison with his utterance. But, in contrast, we can say that he is making the former correspond or fit to the latter; more specifically, while uttering the sentence, he is bringing about an event of the type B it represents, rather than describing an independently existing one, as in (6a). So the situation b supporting his action is not a described, but 'brought-about' situation.

Let me give another example. In writing, as in (8), it is difficult to make an utterance coincide with an action in any exact sense;

(8) I enclose herewith a form of application.

So you may put an application form inside an envelope after writing a letter. In cases like this, we hesitate to say that a writer is describing his act of enclosing a form. Rather he is getting the world to match his words by performing an enclosing action.

Searle (1979: 6-7) notes that some acts need not be performed as speech acts, that is, that some acts called speech or linguistic acts can be performed nonverbally. Consider:

(9) I classify this as an A and this as a B...

You may classify things by uttering this sentence, but, without saying anything, you may simply throw all the As into the box A and all the Bs into the box B. Your throwing action counts as classifying things. Imagine a situation where you are classifying apples into the two classes A and B according to, for example, size and shape. In that situation, while saying sentence (9), 'I classify this as an A and this as a B...' you may put an A-class apple in the A

box and a B-class one in the B box respectively. Probably most speech act theorists do not say that you are describing your classifying action, but do say that you are performing an act of classifying. This means that you are bringing into existence (not describing) a state of affairs of the type represented by your utterance, just as in the case of (6b), and so supports my claim that the speaker in the case of (6b) is making his action correspond to his words because there is no difference in language use between them. However, the case of (9), where the classifying action accompanies the utterance, requires the semantic rule that counts a putting-in action as a classifying one; in this respect, it is not exactly the same as that of (6b), as shown in (10).

(10)

$U = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ classify this as an } A, l \rangle \rangle]$

$B = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{classifying-as, sp, x, } A, l \rangle \rangle]$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ classify this as an } A, l_u \rangle \rangle$

$b \models \langle \langle \text{classifying-as, sp, a, } A, l_b \rangle \rangle,$

where $\text{time}(l_u) = \text{time}(l_b)$.

U	⇒	B	⇐	I
↑		↑		↑
u	→	b	←	i = b

$I = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{putting-in, sp, x, } A, l \rangle \rangle]$

$i \models \langle \langle \text{putting-in, sp, a, } A, l_b \rangle \rangle$

(The situation i that supports the putting-in action is connected to situation b and then, by virtue of the constraint ‘ $I \Rightarrow B$,’ that is, ‘If x is put in the box A , then x is classified as A ,’ situation b is of type B . Situation i is actually situation b , which means that the putting-in action counts as the classifying action.)

Many declarations can be performed with some prescribed actions accompanying them. For example, consider:

- (11) a. A person of authority says, “I declare a war,” and at the same time conveys a diplomatic note or orders his army to start to shoot.
 b. A judge says, “I declare the court adjourned,” and at the same time pounds the gavel.
 c. A person in charge says, “I name this ship the battleship Missouri,” and at the same time smashes a bottle of champagne over the bow of a ship.

In the case of (11a), for example, the systematic relation between the utterance of the sentence *I declare a war* and the accompanying action is illustrated as in:

(12)

$U = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ declare a war, } l \rangle \rangle]$

$B = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{declaring, sp, a-war, } l \rangle \rangle]$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ declare a war, } l_u \rangle \rangle$

$b \models \langle \langle \text{declaring, sp, a-war, } l_b \rangle \rangle$

$b \models \langle \langle \text{conveying, sp, a, n, } l_b \rangle \rangle$

$\text{time}(l_u) = \text{time}(l_b)$

U	\Rightarrow	B
↑		↑
u	\rightarrow	b

Here the situation *b* supports the conveying-a-diplomatic-note action

(i.e., $b \models \langle \langle \text{conveying, sp, a, n, } l_b \rangle \rangle$) and, by virtue of some implicit conventional or institutional rule, it is counted as an act of declaring a war. Just as in the cases of (6b) and (9), we can say that the speaker in (11a) is bringing about the state of affairs represented by his utterance by way of conveying a diplomatic note, that is, that he is making the world correspond or fit to his

words.

We can imagine that, at one stage, the act of uttering a sentence replaces a nonverbal action. That is, the utterance “I declare a war” itself plays a social role in place of an accompanying action of conveying a diplomatic note. To put it differently, the social institution recognizes the utterance as an action of the type it represents, which means that the utterance situation u is counted as a brought-about situation b :

(13)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U & \Rightarrow & B \\ \uparrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & b = u \end{array}$$

$u \models \langle\langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ declare a war, } l_u \rangle\rangle$

$u \models \langle\langle \text{declaring, sp, a-war, } l_u \rangle\rangle$

Thus the act of declaring a war can be performed without a nonverbal action. In the following examples, the utterance of each sentence can perform an intended act, i.e., an act of the type it represents, without any accompanying nonverbal action:⁵

(14) a. I give and bequeath my entire fortune to my nephew.

b. I appoint you chairman.

c. I excommunicate you.

d. I sentence you to life in prison.

And in card and board games: (These are taken from Leech (1987: 8).)

(15) a. I bid two clubs.

b. I resign.

c. I pass.

Also in the following disguised declarations, intended acts can be performed

5 These examples are taken from Searle (1979) and (1995).

verbally:⁶

- (16) a. You' re fired.
 b. The meeting is adjourned.

The same holds true of some speech acts other than declarations. Consider:⁷

- (17) A soldier says, "I volunteer to go on the mission," and at the same time steps forward or raises an arm.

The soldier can perform a volunteering act verbally without any physical action such as stepping forward or raising an arm; it is possible that he is really doing volunteering just in saying, "I volunteer to go to the mission."

In some declaration, by contrast, an utterance cannot replace a nonverbal action. Consider:

- (18) You are under arrest.

In the case of an arrest, the speaker is required to carry out some restraining action in order that a suspect is under arrest (though in some cases mere information is required that he is under arrest). Also, in examples like (6b) and (9), mere utterances cannot perform intended social acts; indeed, in the case of both (6a) and (9), without any nonverbal actions, you would be just uttering sentences.

2 . Linguistic performative utterances

Back and Harnish (1979: 209) note that locutionary verbs such as, *say*, *repeat*, *close*, etc. behave just like performative verbs; 'sentences in which they occur in the first-person present can be true of their very utterance,' as in the case of (19) and (20) :

6 Searle (1979: 27) considers these passive declarations as of active form:

- i. I fire you.
 ii. I adjourned the meeting.
 But Sadock (2004: 58) notes that the active performative (i) is ungrammatical:
 iii. *I fire you.

7 This example is taken from Geis (1995:13-14). He uses it to show that speech acts are not linguistic, but social actions.

(19) a. I say that you are wrong.

b. I say love it is a flower

And you its only seed

From *The Rose*

(20) a. I repeat that there will be no fooling around.

b. I close by saying that, hard as it is, this problem can be solved.

The utterance of a sentence containing such a verb can be counted as an action of the type it represents by virtue of semantic rules concerning the verb's properties. In the case of (19a), for example, to say 'I say that you are wrong' is to say that the addressee is wrong; more specifically, under the condition that the speaker knows the meaning of sentence (19a), his phatic act of uttering the sentence *I say that you are wrong* is counted as a rhetic act of saying that the addressee is wrong. And the systematic relationship between the utterance of (19a) and the brought-about situation is illustrated, as in:

(21)

U = [s | s ⊨ «uttering, sp, *I say that you are wrong*, l »]

B = [s | s ⊨ «saying, sp, *p*, l »]

u ⊨ «uttering, sp, *I say that you are wrong*, l_u»

u ⊨ «saying, sp, *p*, l_u »

p = The addressee is wrong

U	⇒	B
↑		↑
u	→	u

As shown in (21), the utterance situation is of type B as well as of type U.

In the case of (20a), though no special nonlinguistic convention is involved just as in (19a), the felicitous performance of a locutionary act requires a certain precondition to be satisfied; that is, it must be preceded by the utter-

ance “There will be no fooling around”:

(22)

$U = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ repeat that there will be no fooling around, } l \rangle \rangle]$

$B = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{repeating, sp, } p, l \rangle \rangle]$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ repeat that there will be no fooling around, } l_u \rangle \rangle$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{repeating, sp, } p, l_u \rangle \rangle$

$p = \text{There will be no fooling around}$

$U' = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } \textit{There will be no fooling around, } l \rangle \rangle]$

$u' \models \langle \langle \text{saying, sp, } \textit{There will be no fooling around, } l_{u'} \rangle \rangle$

$u' < u$ (u' precedes u .)

U'		U	\Rightarrow	B
\uparrow		\uparrow		\uparrow
u'	$<$	u	\rightarrow	u

The utterance of sentence (20b) is counted as two acts: closing a speech and saying such and such, as in:

(23) $U = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ close by saying that, hard as it is, this problem can be solved, } l \rangle \rangle]$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{uttering, sp, } I \text{ close by saying that, hard as it is, this problem can be solved} \rangle \rangle$

$B = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{closing-a-speech, sp, } p, l \rangle \rangle \wedge \langle \langle \text{saying, sp, } p, l \rangle \rangle]$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{closing-a-speech, sp, } l_u \rangle \rangle$

$u \models \langle \langle \text{saying, sp, } p, l_u \rangle \rangle$

$p = \text{Hard as it is, this problem can be solved}$

U	\Rightarrow	B
\uparrow		\uparrow
u	\rightarrow	u

Assertive verbs such as *report*, *inform*, *state*, *assert*, etc. that contain the 'saying' feature as part of their meaning behave just like the verb *say* with regard to their performativity. So, under appropriate circumstances, utterances like those in (24) and (25) constitute the speech acts they represent solely by virtue of the semantic rules of their verbs.

- (24) a. I report that the light on a street near me needs fixing.
 b. I inform you that I have applied for a position.
- (25) a. I state that we have no intention of opposing simply for the sake of opposition any legislation that might be of benefit to the people.
 b. I assert that the cosmic religious experience is the strongest and the noblest driving force behind scientific research.

Verbs like *tell*, *ask* and *order* also contain the 'saying' or 'speaking' sense.

- (26) a. I tell you to sit down quietly.
 b. I ask you if you can make a photocopy.
 c. I order you to come here.

That is, to tell someone to do something is to say that someone must do something, and to ask someone something is to *speak* to someone in order to get information about something. Thus the utterances in (26) are counted as speech acts of the represented types by the semantic rules in question.

Utterances like those in (27) express the speaker's propositional attitude, i.e., his belief:

- (27) a. I conclude that our greatest scientific achievements will soon be forgotten.
 b. I infer that soccer is popular among the young age group in Australia.

The utterance of sentence (28), in which the verb *believe* occurs in first person present tense, does not describe the speaker's mental state:

- (28) I believe that John is innocent.

Rather, it just expresses his belief attitude; to say 'I believe that John is innocent' is to believe that he is innocent. The meanings of the verbs *conclude*

and *infer* include the meaning of the verb *believe* as their part and, due to this property of *believe*, the utterances in (27) can perform the speech acts they represent. Similarly, the performativity of the intended speech act in (29) is due to the semantic property of the verb *wish*:

(29) I wish you good luck.

The utterance of *I wish...* or *I want...* expresses the speaker's mental state, rather than describes it.

(30) a. I wish that she could come.

b. I want you to go to Thailand.

To say 'I wish that she could come,' for example, is to wish that she could come. By virtue of this property, the utterance in (29) can perform an act of wishing.

Searle (1989) considers performative utterances all to be declarations and classifies them into two categories: extra-linguistic and linguistic declarations. According to him, the former, including speech acts like those in (4), (14), (15) and (16), requires an extra-linguistic institution in addition to a linguistic one and the latter, including those in (24), (25), (26), (27) and (29), need just a linguistic institution or convention. Commissive speech acts like those in (31) and expressive ones like those in (32) are classified into the latter linguistic category:

(31) a. I pledge allegiance to the government.

b. I vow to hold true to the principle of courage: to think and act clearly in the presence of fear.

c. I vow not to smoke.

d. I swear not to be late.

(32) a. I apologize for the message I sent.

b. I heartily congratulate you on your 26th wedding anniversary.

c. I condole with relatives of the perished pilgrims and share their profound grief

d. I praise art for simply being.. art!

But Sperber and Wilson (1995: 245) regard speech acts such as promising and thanking as institutional; that is, they consider that commissive and expressive acts fall into the former extra-linguistic category. I think that they are right. As example (17) shows, a commissive act of volunteering can be performed either verbally or nonverbally. And an expressive act of apologizing can be performed nonverbally; in the Japanese society, for example, a bowing action can count as an apology in place of uttering 'I apologize.' Thus the utterances in (31) and (32) are counted as speech acts of the types they represent by virtue of social institutions rather than linguistic conventions.

3. Why it is not correct to say that all performatives are declarations

Searle (1989: 541) thinks that 'it is correct to say that all performatives are declarations' since they satisfy the definition of a declaration, and analyzes the performative (33) as a declaration like (34):

(33) I order you to leave the room.

(34) Declare (that I order (that you leave the room))

According to Searle (1979) and (1989), the definition is:

(35) An utterance is a declaration if the successful performance of the speech act is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true.

To see how (35) works, consider the declarations in (4), which are repeated here for convenience:

(36) a. I declare the meeting adjourned.

b. I pronounce you man and wife.

c. I name this ship the battleship Missouri.

Searle (1969) proposes that speech acts consist of two parts, the illocutionary force and the propositional content, which is symbolized as ' $F(p)$.' For example, the declaration (36a) consists of the performative prefix *I declare* indicating its illocutionary force and its propositional content 'the meeting is

adjourned’ :

(37) I declare + the meeting be adjourned.

So he considers that the fit brought about by the successful performance of (36a) to make the proposition true is between the words *the meeting (be) adjourned* and the state of affairs of the meeting’s being adjourned. According to my previous discussion, however, the fit is not between them, but between the utterance “I declare the meeting adjourned” and the act of declaring the meeting adjourned, both of which are supported by the utterance situation. And from the declaring act, in turn, results the fact that the meeting is adjourned. This is illustrated as follows:

(38)

U = [s | s ⊨ «uttering, sp, *I declare the meeting adjourned*, l »]

B = [s | s ⊨ «declaring, sp, p, l »]

u ⊨ «uttering, sp, *I declare the meeting adjourned*, l_u »

u ⊨ «declaring, sp, p, l_u »

p = The meeting is adjourned

U	⇒	B	⇒	M
↑		↑		↑
u	→	u	→	m

M = [s | s ⊨ «adjourned, the-meeting, l »]

m ⊨ «adjourned, the-meeting, l_m »

As shown in (38), the state of affairs of the meeting’s being adjourned is supported by the meeting situation m, rather than the utterance situation u. The same is true of the other declarations in (36). In (36b), the state of affairs of the man and woman’s being married is supported by the marriage situation; and, in (36c), the state of affairs of the ship’s having the name ‘The battleship Missouri’ holds in the naming situation.

Incidentally, the chairman can adjourn the meeting by pounding the gavel instead of uttering the sentence *I declare the meeting adjourned*. Such a case is illustrated by:

(39)

$G = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{pounding, the-chairman, the-gavel, } l \rangle \rangle]$
 $g \models \langle \langle \text{pounding, the-chairman, the-gavel, } l_g \rangle \rangle$

$M = [s \mid s \models \langle \langle \text{adjourned, the-meeting, } l \rangle \rangle]$
 $m \models \langle \langle \text{adjourned, the-meeting, } l_m \rangle \rangle$

G	\Rightarrow	M
↑		↑
g	\rightarrow	m

Now, to return to the case of (33), I have shown that, just as in the case of ‘linguistic declarations’ what is fitted to the words in the case of ‘extra-linguistic’ declarations is the speech act performed itself, rather than the state of affairs brought into existence by way of performing it. This implies that, if all performatives were declarations, as Searle proposes, the ‘extra-linguistic’ declarations in (36) would be analyzed in the same way as the ‘linguistic declaration’ (33):

- (40) a. Declare (that I declare (that the meeting is adjourned)).
 b. Declare (that I pronounce you (that you are man and wife)).
 c. Declare (that I name this ship (that its name is the battleship Missouri)).


Let’s see if the performative prefix *Declare* is playing the intended role in this analysis by investigating how the following actual utterance works:

(41) I (hereby) declare that I (hereby) order you to leave the room.

In (41), as expected, the illocutionary act of declaring is performed, as shown in:

(42)

U = [s | s ⊨ «uttering, sp, I (*hereby*) declare that I (*hereby*) order
you to leave the room, l »]
 B = [s | s ⊨ «declaring, sp, p, l »]
 u ⊨ «uttering, sp, I (*hereby*) declare that I (*hereby*) order you to leave
the room, l_u »
 u ⊨ «declaring, sp, p, l_u »
 p = The speaker orders the addressee to leave the room



O = [s | s ⊨ «ordering to leave the room, sp, ad, l »]
 o ⊨ «ordering-to leave the room, sp, ad, l_o »

As the diagram shows, the declaration brings into existence the act of ordering in the situation o. Also, the occurrence of the adverbial *hereby* in the embedded clause indicates that the illocutionary act of ordering is being performed, in addition to the act of declaring, in the utterance (41).⁸ This is shown by:

(43)

U = [s | s ⊨ «uttering, sp, I (*hereby*) declare that I (*hereby*) order
you to leave the room, l »]
 B' = [s | s ⊨ «ordering to leave the room, sp, ad, l »]
 u ⊨ «uttering, sp, I (*hereby*) declare that I (*hereby*) order you to

⁸ Rutherford (1970: 103) says that matrix verbs other than *declare* do not allow the adverbial *hereby* to occur in an embedded clause, as shown by the following unaccepted utterance:

i. I admit that I (**hereby*) promise to stop smoking.

leave the room, l_u »

u = «ordering to leave the room, sp, ad, l_u »

U	⇒	B'
↑		↑
u	→	u

This act of ordering can be considered to be the same as the one occurring in the situation o, which is brought about by the declaration. Thus the overall relationship among the types and situations is illustrated as follows:

(44)

U	⇒	B	⇒	O
↑		↑		↑
u	→	u	→	o = u
↓				↓
U	⇒			B'

It does not seem that, in the actual use of the performative prefix *declare*, the prefix fulfils the expected function; it just helps make the ordering act performed by the embedded clause more explicit. So I have to conclude that Searle's proposal is not plausible.

4 . Conclusion

Performative utterances work in two ways. In the case of declarations and similar performatives, utterances substitute for social acts or physical actions and play their role in social situations; and, in the case of other linguistic performatives, utterances count as speech acts by virtue of semantic rules concerning their main verbs.

Searle's proposal is untenable, since it is offered on the basis of a confusion

of two different fit relations: the relation between uttering a performative sentence and the speech act performed in so doing, and the relation between the propositional content of a declaration and the state of affairs brought about to make it true. In no speech act other than a declaration can the hypothesized performative preface *I declare* play the intended role. So not all performatives are declarations.

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