Conditionals and Hybrid Uses of Language

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1. Introduction

In this paper, we will be mainly concerned with conditionals like those in (1):

(1) a. If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.
b. If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.
c. If it's not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM?

Sweetser (1990: 118-121) refers to them as speech act conditionals; '[i]n these cases, the performance of the speech act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis.' That is, the *if*-clauses in (1) bear a relationship to the speech acts performed in the main clauses rather than to their propositional contents. To make this point clear, compare with them conditionals in (2):

(2) a. If you shave with the water on, you use 6 to 14 gallons each time.
b. If the engine oil is low, a red light goes on indicating "oil".
c. If I have a question, I'll ask her.

The sentences in (2) represent the relations between the contents of their *if*-clauses and their main clauses. In (2a), for example, the *if*-clause expresses a cause, while the main clause expresses an effect, and the conditional sentence as a whole represents a causal relationship: someone's shaving with the water on causes him to use 6 to 14 gallons. Consider further examples:

(3) a. If it rains tomorrow, will the match be cancelled?

b. If it doesn't rain tomorrow, paint the house.

The main clause in (3a) is interrogative in contrast to the conditionals in (2), but the question asked here is about the relation between its propositional content and that of the *if*-clause; namely, the conditional (3a) asks, "Will the rain cause the cancellation of the match?" The same is true of the conditional (3b), though it differs from (3a) in that its main clause is imperative. In the utterance of (3b), the hearer is ordered to make sure that a causal relation holds between the state described in the *if*-clause and the action indicated in the main clause; so (3a) means that, when it does not rain, he must paint the house.

In the case of conditionals (1a), (1b) and (1c), by contrast, the *if*-clauses are semantically independent of the main clauses: that is, there is no discernible causal relation between them. Rather, the *if*-clauses appear to bear a causal relation to the speech acts performed in uttering the main clauses; in other words, the states described in the *if*-clauses may be considered as causing the speech acts represented in the main clauses. Indeed, Van der Auwera (1986: 201-202) proposes that the conditional imperative (4) should be treated as an assertion of (5).

(4) Open the window, if I may ask you to.

(5) If I may ask you to open the window, I ask you to open it.[1]

Pragmatically, however, the performance of the speech act in the main clause is not so dependent on the fulfillment of the state described in the *if*-clause. In the case of (1c), for instance, the utterance of the main clause *what made you decide to leave IBM?* can be counted as a genuine speech act of asking for information, even if the hearer says, "It's rude of you to ask such a question."

So, in the case of a speech act conditional, the utterance of its main

1 Van der Auwera uses the following notation:
⊢(I may ask you to open the window) → (!(you open the window))),
where ⊢ and ! are speech operators and stand for an assertion and for an imperative respectively.

clause plays a dual role; it is counted as the performance of the represented speech act, while that performed speech act is counted as a constituent of the causal relation represented by the whole conditional. This duality is a crucial point in an analysis of a speech-act conditional. Our claim is that the duality is only elucidated by treating the *if*-clause as a sort of 'style adjunct' Consider:

(6) Frankly, we're not sure how to handle the problem.

In this construction, the style adjunct *frankly* describes an assertion made in uttering the subsentence *we're not sure how to handle the problem.* This means that the utterance of the subsentence counts as the performance of the assertive speech act, while it contributes to the propositional content represented by the utterance of *frankly*, that is, the proposition that it is a frank assertion. As shown by this example, the function of the main clause in a speech act conditional is similar to that of the subsentence in (6): performing a speech act and simultaneously contributing to a propositional content.

2. Preliminaries

2.1 Conditionals

Conditionals of natural language are usually discussed in comparison with 'material implication' in formal logic. Some people, including Grice (1989: chapter 4), claim that the English *if-then* phrase is semantically identical with material implication. But then they have to somehow account a causal (or some other) connection between antecedent and consequent in a conditional statement like those in (2). For material implication is a truth function which only takes care of truth and falsehood and gives no account of that connection; its meaning is the negation of the conjunction of its antecedent with the negation of its consequent. In contrast, Van der Auwera (1986) and Sweetser (1990) analyze the statement 'If p, then q' as meaning that there is a causal connection between antecedent p and consequent q; so,

according to them, the state of affairs described in p is a sufficient condition for the realization of the state of affairs described in q. However, their analysis cannot handle the following example, where no real connection, either causal or logical, obtains between its antecedent and consequent:[2]

(7) If the sun rises in the east, I am innocent.

A conditional of this sort is used as an emphatic method of asserting its consequent and suggests no 'real connection' between antecedent and consequent. The full meaning of (7) seems to be that just as its antecedent 'The sun rises in the east' is always true, so is its consequent 'I am innocent.'

Copi (1972: 258-265) says that material implication is the meaning which is included in the meanings of various kinds of conditionals but which does not constitute the entire meaning of any of them. So the material-implication account has to treat a connection asserted in a conditional statement as the meaning which is pragmatically implied or enriched. As for the sufficient-condition account, on the other, its application has to be restricted, since there are some conditions to which the account is not applicable. The account we adopt in what follows is based on the channel theory proposed by Barwise (1993) and Barwise, Gabbay and Hartonas (1995); the theory aims to explain information flow, that is, how it is possible for one thing to carry information about another. In a sense, ours conflates the material-implication and the sufficient-condition account and erases or makes meaningless the boundary between semantics and pragmatics.

First we introduce a mathematical structure N called an *information network* $N = \langle S, C, R \rangle$, where S is a set of situations called sites, C a set of channels, and R a three-place relation $S \times C \times S$. This structure is based on the idea of information flow from communication theory, according to which, in an information *network*, distinct sites are linked together by a variety of communication *channels* along which information flows. We assume that the network we are considering here is homogeneous in the sense

2 Example (7) is taken from Noh (2000:177).

that C⊆S, that is, the set S includes all the members of C. When a particular channel c is fixed, we get the two-place relation R_c called a connection:

(8) $R_c = \{<s, t> \mid <s, c, t> \in S \times C \times S\}$.

With channel c and connection R_c determined by c, the interpretation of a conditional statement 'If A, then B' is defined as follows[3]:

(9) $c \models$ If A, (then) B

$\leftrightarrow \forall s, t [s \models A \wedge R_c (s, t) \rightarrow t \models B]$

The definition roughly means: Channel c is an instance of the general relationship represented by the conditional 'If A, then B,' only when for any situations s and t between which connection R_c holds, if s is of the type determined by A, then t is of the type determined by B. Let us explain this in detail using example (10):

(10) If the engine oil is low, a red light goes on indicating "oil".

Here we have to consider two relations. On the one hand, we have connections between engine-oil situations and red-light situations, which are determined by channel c. On the other hand, there is a relation between the two types represented by the antecedent and consequent of (10). This type-relation is supported by the relationships among situations in the following way:

(11)

	S ⇒ T	
s is of type S (or type S has s as a token)	↑	↑ t is of type T (or type T has t as a token)
	s → t	
	R_c	

- S = [**s** | **s** $\models$ The engine oil is low]
- T = [**t** | **t** $\models$ A red light goes on].

3 's $\models$ S' means the relation between situation s and sentence S such that s is of the type that S expresses. To put it differently, a state of affairs described by sentence S is realized in situation s.

where bold types **s** and **t** are abstraction parameter in type-abstraction.

And the interpretation of (10) is defined as:

(12) c ⊨ If the engine oil is low, a red light goes on

↔ ∀ s, t [s ⊨ The engine oil is low ∧ R_c (s, t) → t ⊨ A red light goes on]

Channel c is a situation described by conditional (10) and, by this, relates both situations at one level and types at the other, as shown in (11). At the level of situations, we have connections determined by c, which relate engine-oil situations to red-light situations. At the level of types, the channel relates the engine-oil type to the red-type; this relation 'S ⇒ T' is a systematic regularity linking those situations. In situation semantics, this sort of systematic regularity expressed by a conditional is called a *constraint*.

As the definition (9) specifies, the interpretation of a conditional is relativized to a channel. This means that channel theoretic interpretation is so flexible that it can be applied to various kinds of conditional. For instance, consider the example (7) (repeated here as (13)), to which the sufficient-condition account fails to apply:

(13) If the sun rises in the east, I am innocent.

A conditional of this sort is often used as an emphatic method of asserting its consequent. So the assertion of (13) is virtually the same as that of (14):

(14) I am innocent.

According to channel theoretic interpretation, we can explain this in the following way. First, (13) is interpreted as (15):

(15) c ⊨ If the sun rises in the east, I am innocent

↔ ∀ s, t [s ⊨ The sun rises in the east ∧ R_c (s, t) → t ⊨ I am innocent]

Here we may consider that the focus situation of the conditional statement as a whole, that is, channel c, is the same as the situation t described by the consequent. For conditional (13) virtually asserts, "I am innocent." Hence the right-hand side of the equation is reduced to (16):

(16) ∀s [s ⊨ The sun rises in the east ∧ R_c (s, c) → c ⊨ I am innocent]

And further to (17):

(17) $\exists$s [s $\models$ The sun rises in the east$\wedge R_c$ (s, c)] $\rightarrow$ c $\models$ I am innocent

Since no real connection is asserted between the antecedent and the consequent in (13), we may suppose that for any situation, channel c connects it to itself as in (18)[4]:

(18) $\forall$s [R_c (s, c)]

(Notice that, if there were no situation connected by c to itself, (16) would be trivially true.) And in any usual situation, the antecedent is true; that is, the sun rises in the east:

(19) $\exists$s [s $\models$ The sun rises in the east$\wedge R_c$ (s, c)]

From (17) and (19), we can draw the following conclusion by the inference rule *modus ponens*:

(20) c $\models$ I am innocent

Next consider:

(21) *Simba*: Hey, uncle Scar, when I'm king, what'll that make you?

Scar : *A monkey's uncle.*

Simba: You're so weird.

From the movie *The Lion King*

By his utterance 'A monkey's uncle,' Scar means the following:

(22) If you are king, I'm a monkey's uncle.

This sort of a conditional is used to emphatically or humorously deny its antecedent by combining it with a consequent which is obviously or ridiculously false; and no real connection is asserted between them. So he really means that Simba will never be king, though probably Simba does not realize his intention.

According to (9), the interpretation of (20) is as follows:

(23) c $\models$ If you are king, I am a monkey's uncle.

$\leftrightarrow$ $\forall$ s, t [s $\models$ You will be king$\wedge R_c$ (s, t) $\rightarrow$ t $\models$ I am a monkey's uncle]

4 Here a well-known saying appears to be true: Everybody's friend is nobody's friend.

Here we may consider that a signal situation s where the antecedent is evaluated is fixed and identical to channel c, since (22) is virtually the same as the denial of its antecedent, and the situation s is focused when (22) is asserted. Hence the right-hand side of the equation in (23) is reduced to (24):

(24) $\forall$ t [c $\models$ You will be king$\wedge R_c$ (c, t) $\rightarrow$ t $\models$ I am a monkey's uncle]

and then to (25):

(25) c $\models$ You will be king $\rightarrow$ $\forall$ t [R_c (c, t) $\rightarrow$ t $\models$ I am a monkey's uncle]

Since no connection is asserted between the antecedent and consequent, channel c relates itself to every situation t, i.e. $\forall$ t [R_c (c, t)]; and obviously there is a situation where the speaker is not a monkey's uncle:

(26) $\exists$t [t $\models R_c$ (c, t)$\wedge\neg$ t $\models$ I am a monkey's uncle]

Therefore, from (25) and (26), we can draw the denial of the antecedent (27) by using the inference rule *modus tollens*:

(27) $\neg$ c $\models$ You will be king

Finally, it may be worth pointing out the special case where the set S (= C) is a singleton, containing only one element, the world w; that is, S = C = { w } and R_w (w, w). With this information network, a conditional is reduced to material implication '$\rightarrow$':

(28) w $\models$ If A, (then) B

$\leftrightarrow$ w $\models$ A $\rightarrow$ w $\models$ B,

where R_w (w, w).

2.2 Hybrid Uses

Recanati (2000: 139-140) says that the word *smart* in example (29) has a dual role; in uttering (29), the speaker is using it, but at the same time, quoting it to ascribe its use to some other person.

(29) That boy is really 'smart.'

He refers to a language use of this sort as 'a hybrid use.' We argued that the sub-sentence *the boss is a moron* of example (30), which contains a speech-act-modifying adverbial, is an instance of a hybrid use (See

Nakashima (2005)):

(30) Confidentially, the boss is a moron.

In this paper, we will argue that the consequents of the conditionals in (1) have a dual role, just as the sub-sentence of (30) does, and further that even antecedents of some conditionals should be analyzed in terms of the notion of hybrid use.

Let us briefly explain the dual role that example (30) has. First consider:

(31) John said confidentially, "The boss is a moron."

What we claimed in Nakashima (2005) is that example (30) has essentially the same semantic structure as the example of direct speech (31). In (31), the utterance "The boss is a moron" presents a specimen and echoes some other utterance that John produced, while the utterance "John said confidentially" describes that same utterance. The relationships among these utterance situations is shown diagrammatically as in (32)[5]:

(32) Mary: John said confidentially, "The boss is a moron."

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D,\ U' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \uparrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

- u $\models$ 《saying, m, JOHN SAID CONFIDENTIALLY》
- u' $\models$ 《saying, m, THE BOSS IS A MORON》
- d $\models$ 《saying-confidentially, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON》
- U = [s | s $\models$ 《saying, m, JOHN SAID CONFIDENTIALLY》]

5 In situation semantics, 's $\models \sigma$' means that the situation s supports the state of affairs σ, or, in more traditional terms, that the state of affairs σ is realized in situation s. So, in this paper, we are using the symbol '$\models$' to refer to the two different relations: of-type and support relation. Let T = [s | s $\models \sigma$], then the two relations are related in the following way:

s $\models$ T $\leftrightarrow$ s $\models \sigma$

- U' = [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《saying, m, THE BOSS IS A MORON 》]
- D = [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《saying-confidentially, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON 》], where m is Mary and j is John.

On the one hand, Mary's utterance "The boss is a moron" is a token of the same type U' as the utterance token d produced by John; on the other hand, her utterance "John said confidentially" describes his utterance d, which is also of the type D determined by its sentence meaning.

We first analyze example (30) as being of the following direct-speech form:

(33) I say confidentially: the boss is a moron.

Then, following the diagram (32), the relationships between utterances and the corresponding situations in (33) is shown as in (34):

(34) John: (I say) Confidentially, the boss is a moron.

U	⇒	D, U'	⇐	U'
↑		↓		↑
u	→	d	←	u'

- u ⊨ 《saying, j, CONFIDENTIALLY》
- u' ⊨ 《saying, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON》
- d = ?
- U = [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《saying, j, CONFIDENTIALLY》]
- U' = [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《saying, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON》]
- D = [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《saying-confidentially, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON》]

That is, John's utterance 'the boss is a moron' presents a specimen and echoes some utterance, just as that of (30) does, while his utterance "(I say) Confidentially" describes it. Yet what is that some utterance or where is it, in this case? Our answer is: It is the utterance 'the boss is a moron' itself;

in other words, the utterance echoes or represents itself, and, at the same time, it is described by the utterance "Confidentially."

(35) d (= u') ⊨ 《saying-confidentially, j, THE BOSS IS A MORON》

This is possible because the utterance "the boss is a moron" is playing a dual role: presenting a specimen and, simultaneously, making an assertion, as shown in (36):

(36) a specimen "the boss is a moron"

⬆

I say confidentially, 'the boss is a moron'

⬇

an assertion that the boss is a moron

An analysis of this sort can easily be extended to cover sentences containing clausal adverbials like those in (37):

(37) a. Since you are interested, Bill is a Catholic.

b. Well, since you must know, Cynthia happens to be my daughter.

F. H. Herbert *The Moon is Blue*

c. *Judge*: ...I have reviewed all of the information carefully. I'm ready to give my decision. *Before I do, is there anything anyone wants to say*?

From the movie *Erin Brockovich*

For instance, example (37a) is analyzed as in (38):

(38) Since you are interested, I say: Bill is a Catholic.

That is, the *since*-clause modifies a speech act performed in uttering the sentence *Bill is a Catholic.* The relationships among utterance situations is illustrated as in (38):

(38) Mary: Since you are interested, (I say:) Bill is a Catholic.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D,\ U' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

$$d = u'$$

- u ⊨ ⟪saying, m, SINCE YOU ARE INTERESTED⟫
- u' ⊨ ⟪saying, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫
- d = u' ⊨ ⟪saying-since-you-are-interested, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫
- U = [**s** | **s** ⊨ ⟪saying, m, SINCE YOU ARE INTERESTED⟫]
- U' = [**s** | **s** ⊨ ⟪saying, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫]
- D = [**t** | **t** ⊨ ⟪saying-since-you-are-interested, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫]

However, this is not adequate enough for an analysis of (37a) because the causal relation indicated by conjunction *since* is not explicitly represented in the described situation d and its type. In the channel theoretic framework, one possible interpretation of the formula 'Since A, B' is as follows:

(39) t ⊨ Since A, B

↔ ∃c, s [s ⊨ A ∧ R_c (s, t) ∧ t ⊨ B]

where c ⊨ If A, then B

↔ ∀s, t [s ⊨ A ∧ R_c (s, t) → t ⊨ B]

Namely, when a speaker utters a sentence of the form 'Since A, B' under the condition that there is a systematic regularity between situations of type A and type B, he asserts that there is a channel c that connects the situation t to some situation s of type A, on the basis of the truth that t is of type B.[6]

Thus the accurate descriptive type D in (38) is as follows:

(40) D = [**t** | **t** ⊨ ⟪saying-since-you-are-interested, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫]

= [t | ∃c, s [s ⊨ ⟪interested, j⟫ ∧R_c (s, t)∧t ⊨ ⟪saying, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC⟫]

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6 There are at least two other possibilities of interpretation:

i. c ⊨ Since A, B

↔ ∃s, t [s ⊨ A ∧ R_c (s, t) ∧ t ⊨ B]

ii. s ⊨ Since A, B

↔ ∃c, t [s ⊨ A ∧ R_c (s, t) ∧ t ⊨ B]

To determine which interpretation is the most appropriate, we have to investigate both semantic and pragmatic properties of the sentence *Since A, B*. Here we leave this question open.

And the accurate described situation is:

(41) $d \models$ 《saying-since-you-are-interested, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC》
$\leftrightarrow \exists c, s\,[s \models$ 《interested, j》$\wedge R_c$ (s, d)$\wedge d \models$ 《saying, m, BILL IS A CATHORIC》

3. An Analysis of Speech Act Conditionals

3.1 Hybrid Uses in Conditionals

On the basis of the preceding discussion, we will analyze speech-act conditionals in (1), which are repeated here as (42), as instances of hybrid use[7]:

(42) a. If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.
b. If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.
c. If it's not rude to ask, what made you decide to leave IBM.

In these cases, the *if*-clauses refer to the conditions on the speech acts performed by the consequent clauses, which state the sort of appropriateness-conditions discussed by Grice (1975) (reprinted in Grice (1989)) and R. Lakoff (1973). To make the utterance of a consequent more polite or appropriate, they serve to give the hearer some option in reacting to the speech act performed in it. For instance, the *if*-clause in (42c) invokes one of the politeness maxims proposed by Lakoff (1973), 'Give options,' and provides the hearer with an option of refusing to answer the question in the consequent

7 In place of antecedents like those in (42), questions like *may I ask* are sometimes used as in (i):
i. a. *Mabel* : ...And may I ask, are you staying in London long?
From the movie *An Ideal Husband*
b. *Arthur*: And so what is it, may I ask, that brings you back after all these years—business or pleasure?
Ibid.
These can be paraphrased as follows:
ii. a. If I may ask, are you staying in London long?
b. If I may ask that brings you back after all theses years—business or pleasure?
The plausibility of such paraphrases seems to rest on the fact that both an antecedent clause and a question are unasserted assumptions.

clause. Further examples are as follows:

(43) a. *Ugarte*: You are a very cynical person, Rick, if you will forgive me for saying so.

From the movie *Casablanca*

b. *Rick*: If you don't mind, Louis, you fill in the names.

Ibid.

c. *Rick*: I was born in New York City if that'll help you any.

Ibid.

d. 'An American doctor?'

'That's it—Nicholson his name is. And *if you ask me, Mr Hawkins, there are some very queer goings on there.*'

A. Christie *Why Didn't They Ask Evans*?

e. Well, she was engaged to be married if that answers your question.

A. Christie *Murder in the Mews*

f. Well, of course she was a nice lady too, but much more abrupt if you know what I mean. And *if you ask me, sir, what you are thinking is all wrong.*

Ibid.

g. *Armstrong*: and where's Rogers? He ought to be about.

Blore: *If you ask me, Master Rogers was pretty badly rattled, last night.*

A. Christie *And then There were None*

h. *Wargrave*: If Miss Claythorne suspects one of us three, that is rather an awkward question.

Vera: I'm sure it isn't any of you. *If you ask me who I suspected, I'd say Doctor Armstrong.*

Ibid.

i. You know, if you won't be offended at my saying so, you're my fancy.

Ibid.

j. You're an odd fish, you know, if you don't mind my saying so.

T. Rattigan *Table Number Seven*

k. *Al: If you ask me, you're a quack.*

Willie: If I was a duck I would ask you...Now roll up your sleeve, I wanna take some blood.

Neil Simon *The Sunshine Boys*

As suggested in the previous section, we will analyze speech act conditionals in the parallel way to sentences containing speech-act modifying adverbials.[8] For instance, we interpret conditional (44a) (=(42a)) as (45a), just as sentence (44b) as (45b).

(44) a. If I may say so, that's a crazy idea (= (42a))

b. Frankly, the boss is a moron.

(45) a. If I may say so, I say: that's a crazy idea.

b. I say frankly: the boss is a moron.

So, in the utterance of (44a), the relationships among the utterance and described situations and their types are shown as in (46):

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8 Geis and Lycan (2001:203-205) doubt that semantics that is true of sentences containing speech-act-modifying adverbials, as in (i), will be extended to cover speech act conditionals.

i. a. Frankly, the boss here is an idiot.

b. Just because my mother may want to know, what is this stuff we're smoking?

For one reason, they claim that 'although factive adverbials headed by 'since' and 'because' do seem to modify the allegedly underlying performative verbs, serving as reason-adverbials describing the corresponding illocutionary acts, 'if' itself does not go well with such verbs.' And they cite these examples:

ii. a. ??If I may speak frankly, I state that the boss here is an idiot.

b. ??If my mother should want to know, what is this stuff we're smoking?

On our account, however, conjunctive *if*, as well as *since* and *because*, does not modify the illocutionary acts, but connects the two situations or situation types represented by a main and subordinate clause. In addition, if the performative clause *I state that* is deleted, (iia) will be acceptable, as shown by Van der Auwera (1986: 199)'s example:

iii. If I can speak frankly, he doesn't have a chance.

(46) If I may say so, I say: that's a crazy idea.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D, U' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

$$d = u'$$

- u $\models$ 《saying, j, IF I MAY SAY SO》
- u' $\models$ 《saying, j, THAT IS A CRAZY IDEA》
- d = the described situation
- U = [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《saying, j, IF I SAY SO》]
- U' = [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《saying, j, THAT IS A CRAZY IDEA》]
- D = the type of the described situation,

where we suppose that the speaker is j (= John) and the hearer is m (= Mary).

Since the clause *I may say so* refers to an illocutionary act, we will focus on the assertion performed in situation u', rather than the utterance act, that is, saying (or uttering) the clause *that's a crazy idea.*

(47) u' $\models$ 《telling, j, m, *p*》

Here *p* is the proposition expressed by the utterance 'that's a crazy idea' and it is represented as:

(48) *p* = (d' $\models$ 《crazy, i》)

And d' is a situation described in the utterance u':

(49) d' $\models$ 《crazy, i》

Then we will replace (46) by the following diagram:

(50)

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D(U''), U'' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

$$d = u'$$

• $U'' = [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{telling, j, m, } p \rangle\!\rangle]$

And let us consider what the described situation d and its type D are like. The situation d is a channel which supports the constraint 'S ⇒ T' expressed by the conditional (42a) and the support relation holds between d and the constraint as in (51):

(51) $d \models S \Rightarrow T$[9]

$\leftrightarrow \forall s, t\,[s \models S \wedge R_d\,(s, t) \rightarrow t \models T]$

T is the type U'' of the utterance u', where the assertive illocutionary act is performed:

(52) $T = U''$

$= [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{telling, j, m, } p \rangle\!\rangle]$

S is the type represented by the *if*-clause *I may say so*:

(53) $S = [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{allowed-to-say, j, } \mathbf{X} \rangle\!\rangle]$

Since the value of variable **X** is the proposition *p*, the right side of the equation in (53) is replaced as in (54):

(54) $S = [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{allowed-to-say, j, } p \rangle\!\rangle]$

Hence the type D of the described situation d is as follows:

(55) $D(U'') = [\,\mathbf{s} \mid S \Rightarrow U'']$

And the support relation in (51) is accurately represented as in (56):

(56) $d \models [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{allowed-to-say, j, } p \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{telling, j, m, } p \rangle\!\rangle]$

$\leftrightarrow \forall s, t\,[s \models S \wedge R_d\,(s, t) \rightarrow t \models U'']$

9 Formally the support relation is represented as in:
$d \models \langle\!\langle \Rightarrow, S, T \rangle\!\rangle$

↔ ∀s, t [s ⊨ 《allowed-to-say, j, *p*》 ∧R_d (s, t) → t ⊨ 《telling, j, m, *p*》]

The described situation d is the situation u' where the consequent clause is uttered. So u' is the channel supporting the constraint represented by conditional (42a). In this case, the connection $R_{u'}$ determined by channel u' is a very limited one; that is, it is the singleton of <u', u'>:

(57) R_d = {<u', u'>}

(We will explain in the next section why the connection $R_{u'}$ is so limited.) This means that the values of the variables s and t are the same u'; s = u' and t = u'. So the relation in (56) is simplified as in (58):

(58) u' ⊨ S ⇒ U''

↔ u' ⊨ [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《allowed-to-say, j, *p*》] ⇒ [**s** | **s** ⊨ 《telling, j, m, *p*》]

↔ u'⊨ 《allowed-to-say, j, *p*》 → u' ⊨ 《telling, j, m, *p*》

Notice here that the assertive illocutionary act performed in situation u' is playing a double role, i.e., making an assertion and, simultaneously, presenting a specimen; in other words, while John is making the assertion that it is a crazy idea, he is also demonstrating that illocutionary act and indicating its type. Sweetser (1991: 121) paraphrases speech act conditionals by this gloss: "If [protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech act (i.e., the one represented as the apodosis)." It seems that this paraphrase describes the demonstrating aspect of the act of uttering the consequent clause.

Also, Sweetser (1991: 118) says that 'the performance of the speech act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis (the state in the protasis *enables* or *causes* the following speech act).' Then what would happen if the condition indicated in the antecedent clause were not satisfied? Would the speech act not be accomplished? If so, the utterance of the consequent clause could not play a dual role. Sweetser suggests that the intended speech act are not performed conditionally, but in fact performed. Dancygier (1998: 89-90) explains this point by using the following exchanges:

(59) a. A: I'll help you with the dishes, if it's all right with you.
B: No, it's all right.
b. A: If I may ask, where were you last night?
B: No, you may not ask.

As she notes, the uncooperative B's utterances do not invalidate A's speech acts; rather, they are respectively interpreted as a rejection of the offer, in the case of (59a), and a refusal to give an answer, in the case of (59b). Furthermore she notes that, as in (60), B can deny the condition stated in the antecedent and still react positively to A's request:

(60) A: If I may ask, where were you last night?
B: In fact I don't think you have a right to ask, but I can tell you anyway—I had a date with Tom.

Antecedents in speech act conditionals like those in (42) refer to politeness conditions or more general appropriateness conditions, rather than essential conditions that enable utterances to count as intended speech acts. So those conditions do not prevent consequents from actually performing speech acts. When they are not satisfied, the speaker of a speech act conditional is just violating politeness rules, rather than vacuously performing a speech act.

Van der Auwera (1986: 201-202) says that the imperative operator has not the widest scope in the imperative speech act conditional (61)[10]:

(61) Open the window, if I may ask you to.

That is, the operator '!' is embedded in the *if-then* construction, as shown in (62):

(62) (I may ask you to open the window) → (!(you open the window))

And he proposes that the assertion operator '⊢' has the whole construction of the conditional imperative (61) in its scope, as in (63):

(63) ⊢ ((I may ask you to open the window) → (!(you open the window)))

10 Holdcroft (1978, Ch. 5) discusses problems concerning the scope of speech act operators.

This proposal conforms to our hybrid analysis of speech act conditionals. In the case of (61), the relationships among the utterance and described situations and their types are shown as in (64):

(64)

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D(U'),\ U' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

$$d = u'$$

- u $\models$ 《saying, j, IF I MAY ASK YOU TO》
- u' $\models$ 《saying, j, OPEN THE WINDOW》

- u $\models$ 《asserting, j, *q*》,
  where *q* = (u' $\models$ S $\Rightarrow$ U')
- u' $\models$ 《asking, j, m, to-open-the window》

- U = [**s** |**s** $\models$ 《asserting, j, *q*》]
- U' = [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《asking, j, m, to-open-the window》]

- d (= u') $\models$ S $\Rightarrow$ U'

- D(U') = [**s** | **s** $\models$ S $\Rightarrow$ U']
- S = [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《allowed-to ask, j, m, to-do **X**》

(Here it is supposed that the speaker is John and the hearer is Mary.)

In the utterance situation u of (64), where the act of uttering the clause *If I may ask you to* is performed, the assertive illocutionary act is also being performed. In his utterance "Open the window, if I may ask you to," John is making the assertion that if he is allowed to ask Mary to, he asks her to

open the window.

Intuitively, however, the utterance of (61) is not interpreted as actually functioning as an assertion, but as an imperative. Our account of this intuition differs from Van der Auwera's. He treats the imperative conditional (61) as a sort of performative sentence. On his account, just as the utterance of the performative sentence (65) is both an assertion about an order, at one level, and, at the other level, the performance of that order, the utterance of (61) is 'both an assertion about an imperative and a performance of that imperative; that is, it is performing both assertive and imperative speech acts.

(65) I hereby order you to leave.

However, this account does not seem to be plausible. For imperative sentences are both semantically and pragmatically different from performatives like (65); it is not 'a purely terminological issue' whether we call imperative sentence (61) performative or not. Moreover, there is another reason why we hesitate to accept his idea. Consider the following two conditionals, which are cited from Declerck and Reed (2001:327):

(66) a. If my niece comes to the party, I ask you to stay away from her.

b. If that's the way you treat me, I advise you to change your attitude.

In both (66a) and (66b), the consequent clauses are performative, i.e., of the first person present tense form, but their functions are different; while the utterance of (66a) is a speech act about a conditional, the utterance of (66b) is a conditional speech act or a speech act conditional.[11] This may be shown by the scope difference of the operators, as in (67):

(67) a. $\vdash$((my niece comes to the party) $\rightarrow$ (I ask you to stay away from her))

b. $\vdash$((that's the way you treat me) $\rightarrow$ ($\vdash$(I advise you to change your attitude)))

Yet a cursory look tells us that (67b) is not accurate because the operator in

11 As Declerch and Reed note, the antecedent clause in (66a) is open and expresses a necessary condition for uttering the consequent, but the antecedent in (66b) is closed and gives the reason for performing the speech act.

the consequent is not assertive, but directive, as in (68):

(68) ⊢ ((that's the way you treat me) → (! (you change your attitude)))

For what the speaker claims to do for the reason expressed by the antecedent is *advise* the hearer to change his attitude, rather than *assert* that she advises him to do so.

Thus, if we followed Van der Auwera's treatment, the interpretation of the utterance of (66b) would be like this. First, the speaker makes an assertion in uttering the performative sentence:

(69) ⊢ (I advise you to change your attitude)

Then this utterance counts as a directive speech act by a convention of interpreting a performative:

(70) ! (you change your attitude)

Then this speech act is incorporated into an assertive speech act about the conditional, as in (68); and again, by the convention, that assertion counts as a directive speech act like (70). However this interpretation is absurd; the directive speech act (70) has already been performed before the assertion (68) counts as directive. There is no reason to count the utterance of (66b) as a directive twice.

In contrast, according to our hybrid analysis, the utterance of the consequent in imperative conditional (61) is actually performing a directive speech act and, simultaneously, indicating the situation type by demonstrating that act; and the utterance of the antecedent incorporates the indicated type into the constraint represented by the conditional. On this basis, the utterance of the whole conditional asserts that that constraint is actual in the utterance situation.

3.2 Constraints and their Instances

In this paper, we have accepted that a conditional expresses a constraint that holds between types of situations or, to put it simply, a systematic relationship between situations. Consider conditional (71):

(71) If it snows, then the sidewalks are slippery.

This conditional describes a constraint between two types of situations, that is, snowy and slippery ones. Contrast the following with it:

(72) a. If it is snowing, then the sidewalks are slippery.

b. If it snowed, then the sidewalks were slippery.

While the constraint described in (71) is a general one, the ones described in (72) are more specific. This is due to the difference in tense between (71) and (72); in (71), the generic tense is used, but, in (72), the present progressive and past tense are used. Barwise (1986:34-39) calls the latter constraints *instances* of the former. Technically speaking, the constraint in (71) contains the space-time parameter **l**, which does not indicate any particular space-time location; in the constraint in (72), in contrast, that parameter is anchored to the particular present time location l' and the past one l'', as shown in (73) and (74):

(73) $[\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{snowing}, \mathbf{l} \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{slippery, sidewalks}, \mathbf{l} \rangle\!\rangle]$

(74) a. $[\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{snowing}, \mathrm{l}' \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{slippery, sidewalks}, \mathrm{l}' \rangle\!\rangle]$

b. $[\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{snowing}, \mathrm{l}'' \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\,\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{slippery, sidewalks}, \mathrm{l}'' \rangle\!\rangle]$

To make this instance relation more understandable, consider the following constraint, where **x**, **y** and **z** are parameters and we assume that $0 < \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}$:

(75) If $\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y}$, $\mathbf{x} < \mathbf{y}$.

This is a simple theorem in arithmetic; it represents a general law relating situations with natural numbers as constituents:

(76) $\mathbf{c} \models [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle +, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle <, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z} \rangle\!\rangle]$

If we anchor **y** to 5 and **z** to 3, respectively, we get the following more specific constraint:

(77) If $\mathbf{x} + 3 = 5$, $\mathbf{x} < 5$.

Also, given another anchor which replaces **x** by 2 and **y** by 5, we are given the following:

(78) If $2 + \mathbf{z} = 5$, $2 < 5$.

In the limiting case, we get a constraint relating types of situations with no parameters at all. For example, consider the following instances containing no parameters:

(79) a. If $2 + 3 = 5$, $2 < 5$.

b. If $4 + 3 = 5$, $4 < 5$.

c. If $6 + 3 = 5$, $6 + 3 = 5$

The constraint in (79a) relates the type of situation containing the fact that $2 + 3$ to the type of situation where $2 < 5$. Similarly, the constraints in (79b) and (79c) relate the two types of situation represented by the antecedents and consequents. Of course, there are no actual situations where $4 + 3 = 5$ or where $6 + 3 = 5$ or $6 + 3 = 5$. However, they are both legitimate instances of the general constraint (76).

Next consider:

(80) If the lights go out, break the circuit before removing the fuse.[12]

This conditional, which might be found written on a fuse box, expresses directions telling what to do in an emergency situation. So the antecedent specifies the emergency situation and the consequent conveys directions as to what should be done in that situation. Directions regulate our forms of behavior: they are considered as constraints of a sort, i.e., conventional ones. Conditional (80) can be paraphrased as in (81):

(81) If the lights go out, you will break the circuit before removing the fuse.

This is an instance of the more general constraint (82):

(82) If the lights go out, one will break the circuit before removing the fuse.

Namely, conditional (82) represents the following constraint:

(83) $[\mathbf{t} \mid \mathbf{t} \models \langle\!\langle \text{going-out, lights, } \mathbf{y} \rangle\!\rangle]$

$\Rightarrow [\mathbf{t} \mid \mathbf{t} \models \langle\!\langle \text{removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, } \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle\!\rangle]$

We get the constraint in (81) by anchoring parameter $\mathbf{x}$ to a hearer in a speech situation where the conditional (81) is uttered. When the general

12 This example is cited from Tedeschi (1974: 139). He notes that conditionals of this sort can be paraphrased by the use of *whenever* in place of *if*.

conditional is uttered, the relationships among situations and their types are shown as in (84):

(84)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U & \Rightarrow & D \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d \end{array}$$

- u $\models$ 《saying, m, Φ》

  Φ = If the lights go out, one will break the circuit before removing the fuse

- d $\models$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《going-out, lights, **y**》]

  $\Rightarrow$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, **x**, **y**》], where we assume that Mary is the speaker.

Other instances of the constraint (82) are:

(85) a. If the lights go out, John will break the circuit before removing the fuse.

b. If the lights went out, John broke the circuit before removing the fuse.

The utterance of (85a), for example, describes a more limited situation d' than d, as in (86):

(86) d' $\models$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《going-out, lights, l》]

$\Rightarrow$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ 《removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, j, l》]

In other words, the connection $R_{d'}$ determined by d' is a subset of the connection R_d determined by d; $R_{d'} \subseteq R_d$.

To turn to our main topic, hybrid uses of language, let us now consider an imaginary situation involving the conditional (80). Suppose that John utters its antecedent and then, instead of uttering its consequent, demonstrates the directions it described to accurately show how to do in the specified situation. That is, actually he removes the fuse first and then breaks the circuit:

(87) John: If the lights go out, (I do this:) [carrying out the directions]

Demonstrating is a method of signaling. Clark (1996: 172-173) explains it in the following way:

> Suppose George tells Helen, "Elizabeth drinks tea like this." He holds an imaginary saucer in his left hand. Then, with his right hand, pinkie up, he picks an imaginary cup off the saucer, lifts it to his lips, tips it, purses his lips with eyes half closed, and pretends to drink. Then he returns his hands, relaxed, to his lap. With these actions, George demonstrates to Helen how Elizabeth drinks tea. He *means* that Elizabeth drinks tea in such and such a way, and that makes his action a signal.

By carrying out a series of actions, George demonstrates or depicts the way Elizabeth drinks tea; in other words, he signals a situation where she does so with icons. This signaling relationship between the demonstrating and signaled situation is shown as in (88):

(88)

Dm	⇒	Dm
↑		↓
d_m	→	e

- $d_m \models$ 《holding, g, saucer》 ∧ 《picking, g, cup》 ∧...
- e ⊨ 《drinking, b, tea》

In the case of (87), John demonstrates his own actions, rather than another person's as in (88). So the type-situation relationships in (87) are shown as in (89):

(89)

U	⇒	D (Dm)	Dm
↑		↓	↑↓
u	→	d	d_m

- u ⊨ 《saying, j, IF THE LIGHTS OU OUT》
- D (Dm) = [**s** | **s** ⊨ [**t** | **t** ⊨ 《going-out, lights, y》] ⇒ Dm]

- $d_m \models$ ⟪removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, j, **y**⟫
- Dm = [**s** | **s** ⊨ ⟪removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, j, **y**⟫]
- d ⊨ [**s** | **s** ⊨ ⟪going-out, lights, **y**⟫] ⇒ Dm

The constraint D (Dm) contains type Dm, which is indicated by John's demonstrating actions, as its constituent. It is a legitimate instance of the general constraint (83) and supported by situation d.

Next consider:

(90) If the lights go out, first I remove the fuse and then break the circuit.

In this case, John demonstrates the directions and also describes them. Namely, the demonstration and description happens at the same time and place or in the same situation. So the situation-type relationships are more complicated as shown in (91):

(91)

U	⇒	D(Dm)	Dm	⇐	U'
↑		↓	↑↓		↑
u	→	d	d_m	←	u'
					u' = d_m

- u' ⊨ ⟪saying, j, I REMOVE THE FUSE AND THEN BREAK THE CIRCUIT⟫
- U' = [s | s ⊨ ⟪saying, j, I REMOVE THE FUSE AND THEN BREAK THE CIRCUIT⟫]

Now let us consider how the conditional (80) is used in an emergency situation where the lights actually go out. Suppose that in that situation, Mary tells John what happens and he carries out the specified directions, as in (92):

(92) *Mary*: The lights went out.

John: If the lights went out, first I remove the fuse and then break the circuit.

(or "The lights went out? If so, first I remove the fuse and then break

the circuit.")

In this case, the situation described by the conditional is much more restricted than the one in (87) or (90). Indeed, the described situation d in (92) is the demonstrating situation d_m itself, as shown in:

(91)

U	⇒	D(Dm)	Dm	⇐	U'
↑		↓	↑↓		↑
u	→	d	d_m	←	u'
		$d = u' = d_m$			$u' = d_m$

- $d \models$ ⟪going-out, lights, l⟫

Or (93) is simplified as in:

(94)

U	⇒	D(Dm), Dm	⇐	U'
↑		↑↓		↑
u	→	d_m	←	u'
				$u' = d_m$

As in (87), suppose that John just demonstrates the actions without a word:

(95) *Mary*: The lights went out.

John: If the lights went out, [demonstrating the directions]

Then the situation-type relationships are like this:

(96)

U	⇒	D(Dm), Dm
↑		↑↓
u	→	d_m

The situation d_m, which is a token of type Dm, is also a token of type D(Dm), as in (97):

(97) $d_m \models [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models$ 《going-out, lights, lm》]

$\Rightarrow [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models$ 《removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, j, l_m》]

The emergency situation specified by the antecedent is the described situation on which the speaker, John, is focusing his attention and in which he is also making a demonstration. So we propose that the connection R_{dm} determined by the described situation d_m is the singleton of $< d_m, d_m >$, i.e., $R_{dm} = \{< d_m, d_m >\}$. Thus (96) is equivalent to (98):

(98) $d_m \models$ 《going-out, lights, l_m》

$\rightarrow d_m \models$ 《removing-the-fuse-and-breaking-the-circuit, j, l_m》

We are now in a position to fully discuss how to analyze speech act conditionals like (99):

(99) If I may say so, that's a crazy idea. (= (1a))

We claim that the general conditional which underlies the speech act conditional (99) is the following:

(100) If you are allowed to say X, say X.

Or (101), which is more general:

(101) If one is allowed to say X, he will say X.

This represents the constraint (102):

(102) $[\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models$ 《allowed-to-say, **x**, **X**》$] \Rightarrow [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models$ 《saying, **x**, **X**》]

If we anchor **x** to John and **X** to *That's a crazy idea*, we get an instance of (103):

(103) If he is allowed to say so, John will say, "That's a crazy idea."

Also, the conditional in (104) is an instance of the general conditional (105).

(104) If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go. (= (1b))

(105) If you haven't already asked a guest to sign the guest book, ask him to do so before he goes.

And the following is another instance of (104):

(106) Guests will be asked to sign the guest book before they go if they have not already been asked to do so.

To ascertain that an instance relation like this is legitimate, let us consider the following example:

(107) Jill Robinson, Asian representative for the International Fund for Animal Welfare, says restaurants use codes to disguise the real content of dishes. "*If a customer asks for a pangolin, he will be told 'We don't have pangolin but why don't you try this,'* and he is then served pangolin."

By Paul Mooney in *The Japan Times*, January 30, 1992

It is very reasonable to claim that the conditional in (107) is counted as an instance of the following general conditional:

(108) If a customer asks for a pangolin, tell him, 'We don't have pangolin but why don't you try this.

We also have other general conditionals and their corresponding instances:

(109) a. If you've finished your homework, go out and play.

b. Go out and play after you finish your homework.

(110) a. If you're cold, close the window.

b. If someone is cold, advise him to close the window.

(111) a. If you're thirsty, drink some water.

b. If someone is thirsty, offer him some water.

As is clear from our discussion about the conditionals in (92) and (95), the speech act conditional (99) is similar to them in that in both cases, the situation described by the conditional is the one where the speaker is making a demonstration; they only differ in that the speaker is performing a speech act in (99), while he is carrying out nonlinguistic actions in (92) and (95).[13]

We have already proposed that the situation-type relationships in (99)

13 Sweetser (1990: 121) paraphrases speech act conditionals by this:

If [protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech act (i.e., the one represented as the apodosis).

This paraphrase seems to indicate the demonstrational role the utterance of the apodosis plays.

is as follows:

(112) = (50)

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} U & \Rightarrow & D(U''), U'' & \Leftarrow & U' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow & & \uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & d & \leftarrow & u' \end{array}$$

$$d = u$$

• $U'' = [s \mid s \models \langle\!\langle \text{telling, j, m, } p \rangle\!\rangle]$

Here a question arises as to whether the conditional in (99) is of the type presented in (92) or in (95). The answer is that it is of the latter type; in (99), the speaker is only performing an assertive act, and it is not the case that he is describing that act at the same time. The figure in (112) can be altered as follows:

(113)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U & \Rightarrow & D(U''), U'' \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow\uparrow \\ u & \rightarrow & u' \end{array}$$

This is the same as the figure in (96). Incidentally, let us look at a similar instance of the general conditional in (108):

(114) *Customer*: Do you have a pangolin?

Waiter: If you ask for a pangolin, we don't have pangolin but why don't you try this.

Here the waiter is performing an offer but *not* describing that act as well.

Sweetwer (1990: 118-119) and Dancygier (1998: 89-90) make some comments on how to interpret a speech act conditional when the situation specified by its antecedent is not actual. Consider:

(115) a. A: If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.

B: No, you may *not* say so.

b. A: I'll help you with the dishes, if it's all right with you.

B: No, it's not all right.

c. A: If I may ask, where were you last night?

B: No, you may not ask.

On their account, even when a hearer overtly denies the antecedent as in (115) (although it may be actually hard to make such a reply), the speech act intended in uttering the consequent is fully accomplished. Dancygier says that, even if the B speakers in (115b) and (115c) "appear to be highly uncooperative, in both a linguistic and a social sense, and say something like *No, it's not all right, or No, you may not ask*, this would rather be interpreted as a rejection of the offer, and an answer, not as invalidating the condition on which the speech act was supposedly contingent." And she continues that "the hearer can reject the condition and still react positively to the speech act," as in:

(116) A: If I may ask, where were you last night?

B: In fact I don't think you have a right to ask, but I can tell you anyway—I had a date with Tom.

Even in these cases, the speech act conditionals in (115) and (116) are legitimate instances of their underlying general conditionals or constraints. For example, consider the instance constraint represented by the conditional in (115a):

(117) $u \models [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{allowed-to-say, a, } l_u, \mathbf{X} \rangle\!\rangle] \Rightarrow [\mathbf{s} \mid \mathbf{s} \models \langle\!\langle \text{saying, a, } l_u, \mathbf{X} \rangle\!\rangle]$

$\leftrightarrow$ $u \models \langle\!\langle \text{allowed-to-say, a, } l_u, X \rangle\!\rangle \rightarrow u \models \langle\!\langle \text{saying, a, } l_u, X \rangle\!\rangle$

X = THAT'S A CRAZY IDEA

Under the circumstances we are now concerned with, where the intended assertive speech act is not allowed at the space time location l_u, the support relation in the antecedent does not hold, so the situation is not of the specified type. But the support relation in the consequent does hold; that is, the intended speech act is actually performed. This case is similar to that in (118):

(118) If 4 + 3 = 5, 4 < 5. (= (79b))

In both cases, there are no situations of the types specified by the antece-

dents, but the conditionals themselves are legitimate instances.

Here some notes are necessary. When the conditional (100), for example, is used, we are invited to infer the following conditional:

(119) If you are not allowed to say X, don't say X.

Namely, we interpret the antecedent as expressing the necessary and sufficient condition. So if you say X when it is not allowed, you will violate a politeness rule. Further, consider:

(120) A: If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

B: You've already asked me, so I signed it.

In this case, too, although it is not fulfilled, the condition is not essential for a directive speech act, so the act of requesting is really accomplished. Of course, it is superfluous.

3.3 Echoic Uses in Antecedents

In this section, we will make a brief observation of echoically used antecedents and analyze them in our channel theoretic terms. We will argue that they are sometimes used both echoically and descriptively.

First compare the following two sentences:

(121) a. If he's left destitute, I'll change my will.

b. If he'll be left destitute, I'll change my will.

Sentence (121a) is what Sweetser (1990) calls a content conditional, but sentence (121b) is not, since the future *will* appears in the antecedent. Wekker (1980:99-109) notes that (121b) 'could be an echo of something predicted by another speaker earlier in the context,' and paraphrases its antecedent by 'if you think/say that this will happen.' Noh (2000: 187) also notes that in (122), 'the antecedent of B's conditional would be understood as representing A's utterance, and paraphrase it in the same way, as in (123):

(122) A: I loved her.

B: If you loved her, why didn't you come to the party?

(123) If you believe/say you loved her, why didn't you come to the party?

Before analyzing antecedents like these, let us look at some more examples. Consider:

(124) ["I can't reach him. He must have switched off his mobile phone. "—" Well,] if you can't reach him, you can't reach him. [Try again tomorrow.]"

This is a typical example of echoic use; the speaker repeats the hearer's exact words, just as in (122). Declerch and Reed (2001: 359-360) refer to sentences of this sort as pleonastic conditionals, because the consequent is a repetition of the antecedent. The following idiomatic expression is a similar example, though the connective is not *if*, but *when*:

(125) *Novak*: This guy has had a rebirth. This is a different fella in the White House now.

Kingsley: It doesn't happen often, Bob, but *when you're right, you're right.*

From the movie *Dave*

In this example, the echoed words are not a precise repetition of the hearer's. It is paraphrased by:

(126) When you say you are right, you are right.

Or more explicitly:

(127) When you say, "I'm right," I say, "You are right."

Similarly, the antecedent of the conditional in (128) is not a repetition of the hearer's utterance, but of the content it implies:

(128) *Elderly Man*: You can't talk to my wife like that. Who do you think you are?

Countess: I'm a genuine Countess with a lot of dough, and *if that's your wife, she's a tub of guts.*

From the movie *The Purple Rose of Cairo*

Next consider:

(129) Men's interest in the details of politics, news, and sports is parallel to

women's interest in the details of personal live. *If women are afraid of being left out by not knowing what is going on with this person or that, men are afraid of being left out by not knowing what is going on in the world.*

D. Tannen *You Just Don't Understand*

In this case, the antecedent does not echo any specific person's utterance; that is, the speaker does not have any particular person in mind, but intends to echo the thought entertained by whoever is concerned with women's social interaction. Noh (2000:187-188) cites interesting examples:

(130) a. [Seeing a road sign "ROADWORKS AHEAD, DELAYS POSSIBLE"]
Driver: If delays are possible, delays are necessary.

b. A: [writing in his notes "2 + 1 = 4"]
B: If 2 + 1 = 4, you need more homework.

c. [Mother raises a finger to her lips, indicating a baby's cot]
Boy: If I have to be quiet, I will play outside.

In (130a) and (130b), the echoed utterances are written and, in (130c), what is echoed is an unspoken thought. The antecedents are paraphrased respectively as follows:

(131) a. If they say delays are possible...

b. If you say 2 + 1 = 4...

c. If you mean I have to be quiet...

Declerck and Reed (2001: 83) note that propositions expressed by antecedents may be 'echoes of an internal or mental proposition (thought) such as the interpretation of an experience, perception, etc.' and cite the following:

(132) a. (*watching the clock*) If it's already 8.45, I'd better hurry up.

b. (*addressing someone ostentatiously turning his back to the speaker*)
If that's how you feel, there's nothing more to be said.

These examples are different in the way they echo; the antecedent in (132a) is, as they note, an echo of the interpretation of a perception, whereas, in

(132b), the speaker seems to say, in his inner speech, something like: "Do you say that's how you feel? If so/If you say that's how you feel, ..." To ascertain that this interpretation is plausible, let us consider the following example:

(133) *Ed*: ...Look, what is, what is all this? Uh...what is the story on this... this cancer stuff?

Erin: You wanna know? You have to hire me back. I got a ton of bills to pay.

Erin Brokovich

Of Erin's utterances, the first and the second appear to be connected as follows:

(134) *Erin*: (Do you say) You want to know?

Ed: Yes, I want to know.

Erin: If you say you want to know, I say you have to hire me back.

And, as is clear from the examples in (135), questions and *if*-clauses are similar in function:

(135) a. *Mabel*: ...And *may* I ask, are you staying in London long?

From the movie *An Ideal Husband*

b. *Mrs Cheveley*: I find that I know Lady Chiltern already.

Robert: Really?

Mrs Cheveley: Yes. We were at school together. And *do you know* I have a distinct recollection of Lady Chiltern always getting the good conduct prize.

Ibid.

The underlined question forms *may I ask* and *do you know* can be paraphrased as in (136):

(136) a. If I may ask, are you staying in London long?

b. If you don't know, (I say) I have a distinct recollection of...

The conditional in (137) can be interpreted along these lines of analysis:

(137) *Erin*: With this real estate stuff, could you remind me, 'cos I'm a little

confused exactly how we do it. Why are there medical records and blood samples in real estate files?

Anna: Erin, you've been here long enough. *If you don't know how to do your job by now, I'm not about to do it for you.*

Erin Brokovich

Namely, Anna's conditional is interpreted as in:

(138) Do you say you don't know how to do your job by now? If you say you don't know, I say I'm not about to do it for you.

Similarly, the examples in (139a), (139b) and (139c) are analyzed respectively as in (140):

(139) a. *Avery*: Sonny, you're not the firm's only concern here. We put you into deals with other clients where they may be very sensitive about exposing their relationships to outside attorneys.

Sonny: You hear that, Counselor [= Mitch]? That's a veiled threat. *If you're talking about our friends in Chicago, they don't make money when pay you fees. You make money when I pay you fees.*

From the movie *The Firm*

b. *The speaker, named Congressman Billings, speaks from behind a podium.*

Billings: If you want to follow along with me, we'll begin on page "i" of the introduction.

Ibid.

c. *Mitch holds his finger up to his lips, motioning for Abby to be silent.*

Abby: Hey! If you're afraid you'll wake the kids, we don't have any.

Ibid.

(140) a. You say you are talking about our friends in Chicago? If you say you are talking..., I say they don't make money when...

b. You say you want to follow along with me? If you say you want to follow..., I tell you we'll begin on page 'i'...

c. You say you're afraid you'll wake the kids? If you say you're afraid..., I say we don't have any.

Other examples are:

(141) a. *Rick*: I was born in New York City if that'll help you any.

Casablanca

b. If it won't spoil your supper, come on down for a cup of tea.

R. Anderson *Tea and Sympathy*

c. *Laura*: You see, I feel he's a "regular fellow"...whatever that is.

Herb: You do?

Laura: *If it's sports that matter, he's an excellent tennis player.*

Ibid.

c. All I propose is that we should be kind to this poor girl. We must help; her to prepare and fit herself for her new station in life. *If I did not express myself clearly it was because I did not wish to hurt her delicacy, or yours.*

B. Shaw *Pygmalion*

d. *Ben*: And if you're waiting for a laugh, you're not going to get one from me.

N. Simon *The Sunshine Boys*

e. *Al*: Well, listen, it's very good money. It's only a few days' work, I can be back in New Jersey. *If you feel you'd like to do it, then my feeling is I'm agreeable.*

Ibid.

f. *Al*: ...You know why we've been doing it [= the sketch] the same way for forty-three years? Because it's good.

Willie: And you know why we don't dot it any more? Because we've been doing it the same way for forty-three years.

Al: So if we're not doing it any more, why are we changing it?

Ibid.

g. *Nurse*: I mean, *if you're considering getting well again, you have to stop worrying about telephone calls and messages, and especially about when you're going back to work.*

Willie: I'm an actor—I have to act. It's my profession.

Nurse: Your profession right now is being a sick person. And *if you're gonna act anywhere, it's gonna be from a sick bed.*

Ibid.

Notice that examples (141a) and (141b) contain the future *will* in their antecedents, which clearly indicates that they are echoes of the hearer's supposed utterances. In some cases, a hearer's thought is explicitly echoed. Consider:

(142) a. *German*: I've been in every gambling room between Honolulu and Berlin and *if you think I'm going to be kept out of a saloon like this, you're very much mistaken.*

Casablanca

b. *Renault*: Frankly, I have no conviction, if that is what you mean.

Ibid.

The conditional in (142a) contains the phrase *you think*, which indicates the hearer's thought. This example can be put into the following context:

(143) A: Are you going to leave here?

B: If (you think) I'm going to be kept out of a saloon like this, you're very much mistaken.

The conditional in (142b) can be interpreted in a similar vein:

(144) You mean I have no conviction? If so, I say frankly, I have no conviction.

We will now make a channel theoretic analysis of a speech act conditional whose antecedent echoes some other utterance by using example (145):

(145) If that's your wife, she is a tub of guts.

(As in (128), we assume that the countess is the speaker of this conditional and the elderly man is the hearer.) This is schematically analyzed as in (146):

(146)



The utterance "that is your wife" indicates its own type to echo the other utterance; on the other hand, the utterance "she is a tub of guts" also indicates its own type and, at the same time, performs a speech act of that type. The whole utterance "If that's your wife, she is a tub of guts" indicates its own type to mean a described situation by way of the conventional meaning 'U ⇒ D'.[14] The details of the situation-type relationships in the case of (145) is shown, as in (147):

(147)



- u ⊨ ⟪saying, ct, IF (u')⟫
- u' ⊨ ⟪saying, ct, THAT IS YOUR WIFE⟫
- d' ⊨ ⟪wife, b, a⟫
- u' ⊨ ⟪telling, ct, y, *p*⟫

14 Wekker (1980: 101) suggests that (ii) is the underlying structure of (i):
i. If he'll be left destitute, I'll change my will.
ii. I assert [I'll change my will] if you say [he will be left destitute]
However, as Van der Auwera (1976:201) notes, we need another speech act indicator 'I assert' which embeds the conditional in its scope, as in (iii):
iii. I assert [I assert [I'll change my will] if you say [he will be left destitute]]

p = the proposition that that is your wife

= (d' $\models$ ⟪wife, b, a⟫)

• u'' $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, q⟫

q = the proposition that b is a tub of guts

• U = [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪saying, ct, IF (U')⟫]

• U'= [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪saying, ct, THAT IS YOUR WIFE⟫]

• S = [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪telling, **x**, **y**, p⟫]

• D' = [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪wife, b, a⟫]

• U'' = [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, p⟫],

where a is the elderly man, b, his wife and ct, the countess.

Here the countess demonstrates an assertive speech act and indicates the speech-act type S; and this type S has utterance u''' as its instance. In this type-instance relation, parameters **x** and **y** are anchored to the elderly man and the countess respectively, i.e., the elderly man tells the countess that the woman is his wife. Thus the countess's speech act represents the elderly man's speech act by way of type S.

The described situation supports the constraint represented by the conditional in (145):

(148) d $\models$ S $\Rightarrow$ T

Here T = U', and U'' = [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, p⟫]. So we get (149):

(149) d $\models$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪telling, a, ct, p⟫ $\Rightarrow$ [**s** | **s** $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, q⟫]

$\leftrightarrow$ $\forall$s, t [s $\models$ S$\wedge R_d$ (s, t) $\rightarrow$ t $\models$ U']

$\leftrightarrow$ $\forall$s, t [s $\models$ ⟪telling, a, ct, p⟫ $\wedge R_d$ (s, t) $\rightarrow$ t $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, p⟫]

Moreover, d = u', R_d = {<u''', u'>}, s = u''' and t = u'. So (149) is simplified, as in (150):

(150) u'''$\models$ ⟪telling, a, ct, p⟫ $\rightarrow$ u' $\models$ ⟪telling, ct, a, p⟫

In the case of (145), the speaker does not claim that there is a causal connection between the antecedent and consequent. The conditional in (145) is a

comparing conditional.[15] Namely the speaker, the countess, links her utterance to the elderly man's speech by hinting a feature that are common to both; and that feature is 'arrogance'. So the utterance in (145) can be paraphrased in the following way: You say arrogantly, "This is my wife." If you say so, I also say arrogantly, "Your wife is a tub of guts." The general constraint that has conditional (145) as its instance is something like: If someone says something arrogant, counter that!

Noh (2000: 187) notes that the antecedent of B's conditional in (151) (= (122)) can be paraphrased in another way, as in (152):

(151) A: I loved her.
B: If you loved her, why didn't you come to the party?

(152) If you loved her, as you say, why didn't you come to the party?

And he continues that (152) metarepresents the propositional form. However, what is represented in (152) is not only the propositional form, but also the tropic, i.e., the it-is-so component, of A's statement.[16] So (152) is further paraphrased by means of the following gloss:

(153) If it is true that you loved her, as you say, why didn't you come to the party?

In this connection, Declerck and Reed (2001: 85) cite interesting examples like these:

(154) a. ["Mummy, the milkman's here."]—"If the milkman's here, open the door for him."
b. (*seeing the milkman coming up the drive*) *If the milkman's here, open the door for him.
d. (*seeing the milkman coming up the drive*) If the milkman's here, it must be later than I thought.

In (154a), the antecedent echoes the child's utterance "the milkman's here",

15 For comparing conditionals, see Declerck and Reed (2001: 330-339).
16 For the tropic, see Hare (1971: 89-93) and Lyons (1977: 749-751).

while, in (154b) and (154c), the antecedent is an echo of the speaker's internal thought based on her own perception.[17] The reason why the antecedent in (154b) is impeccable, but not in (154c) is that what is echoed on the basis of first-hand knowledge is an internal or mental thought or the tropic. Since the consequent is imperative, the conditional in (154b) is about the relation between two speech acts, that is, an assertion and a direction. Then it is not acceptable; the antecedent cannot echo a speech act. On the other hand, the conditional in (154c) is inferential; it is concerned with the truth of both the antecedent and the consequent. So it can be paraphrased, as in (155):

(155) If it is true that the milkman is here, it must be true that it is later than I thought.

Similar examples are:

(156) a. If he isn't happy—and he obviously isn't—it's because of his marriage, surely.[18]

Declerck and Reed (2001: 86)

b. *Renault*: I have seen the lady. And *if he did not leave her in Marseilles, nor in Oran, he will not leave her in Casablanca.*

Casablanca

e. 'Forgery,' said Frankie thoughtfully. 'That letter from you, Bobby, was remarkably well done. I wonder how he knew your

---

17 An antecedent sometimes echoes or repeats the speaker's own speech, as shown by this example:

Perhaps it is because my very unworthy mantle is about to fall on your shoulders. *If that is so* I shall take a prophet's privilege and foretell that you will have a very great success with the lower fifth.

T. Rattigan *The Browning Version*

18 Geis and Lycan (2001:205) cites the following similar example, in which an asserted conjunct is interpolated between the antecedent and consequent:

i. If you want to know, and I'm sure you do because this is a really juicy piece of gossip about that world-class turkey you got married to time before last—the whole Personnel Department was arrested last week and he in particular was charged with molesting marsupials.

And they note that this will be a complication that will obstruct semantics for speech act conditionals.

handwriting?'

'If he's in with the Caymans he probably saw my letter about the Evans business.'

A. Christie *Why Didn't They Ask Evans?*

In these cases, the antecedent is not only echoing an internal thought, but also performing a speech act. For instance, this double function in (154c) is shown in the following way:

(157)

U

↑

assert: [If it is true (U') , it must be true (U'')]

↓↑ ↓↑

I assert, "the milkman is here" I assert, "it must be later than I thought"

That is, the conditionals in (154c) and (156) are examples of 'double hybrid use of language'.

3.4 Conditionals and Indirect Speech Acts

Let us start with 'biscuit' conditionals like these[19]:

(158) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.

b. If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge.

c. Your medicine's there, anyway, if you want it.

T. Rattigan *The Browning Version*

Sweetser (1990: 119-120) claims that conditional (158a) is analyzed as a speech act conditional and reads it as follows:

(159) *If* you want biscuits, then (let us consider that) I *inform* you that there are biscuits on the sideboard.

Since 'the condition "if you want them" presents us with the Gricean suffi-

19 Conditional (158a) was used by J. I. Austin. Since then, such sentences have been often referred to as 'biscuit' conditionals. See Geis and Lycan (2001:184).

cient condition for making the previous statement—and, equally, for the offer inherent in the statement,' she says that a better reading for (158a) is (160):

(160) I hereby *offer* you some biscuits on the sideboard, if you want them.

That is, the statement "There are biscuits on the sideboard" presents us with a preparatory condition for an offer, so it counts as a commissive speech act of offering biscuits.[20] And the condition 'if you want' is a sufficient condition for performing that act. Indeed, without the antecedent, the consequent itself can perform a speech act of offering biscuits. Consider:

(161) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard.

b. There's beer in the fridge.

c. Your medicine's there, anyway.

These sentences can be used to perform an offer in appropriate contexts.

Some other examples are:

(162) a. *Erin*: So you look over that, and *if you have any questions or anything, I'll be here all day.*

Erin Brokovich

b. *Recruiter 4*: ...And if you're a Lakers fan, we have a fabulous box at the Forum.

The Firm

The consequents in (162) are also performing an offer, as shown by the following paraphrases:

(163) a. If you have any questions, I'll answer them because I'll be here all day.

b. Use a fabulous box we have at the forum, if you're a Lakers fan.

Other speech acts are found in conditionals of this sort:

(164) a. I'm very interested in foreign stamps, if you get any letters from abroad.

b. If you find any money, John is looking for some he lost.

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20 For a preparatory condition for a speech act, see Searle (1969: 58-60).

c. If there is a word you hear that you don't understand, there's a dictionary at the front of the room—look it up.

From the movie *Pay it Forward*

The consequents in (184) are a request like "I ask you to give me foreign stamp", a suggestion like "I suggest to you that you let him know it" and an advice like " I advice you to look it up in the dictionary."

Next consider Noh (2000: 198)'s example:

(165) [The door bell is ringing.]

Mary to Jane: If that's John, I'm not here.

According to Noh (2000: 203-2-4), 'the consequent metarepresents the utterance that Mary wants Jane to make if John is at the door.' And he proposes that the propositional form of the conditional is represented as in (166):

(166) If [that's John], [you tell him I am not here]

On our account, Mary indicates the utterance type U by demonstrating the utterance "I'm not here," as in:

(167)

I say: If that's John, [U [(I ask you to tell him])]

↑

I say: I'm not here

• U = [**s** | **s** ⊨ ⟪asking-to-tell, Mary, Jane, John, I'M NOT HERE⟫]

Here the information that Mary asks Jane to tell John something is given contextually. For example, consider:

(168) a. *Erin*: ...So, if you could just tell her I won't take up too much of her time.

Erin Brokovich

b. *Ugarte*: Oh, waiter. I will be expecting some people. *If anybody asks for me, I will be right here.*

Casablanca

In these cases, the antecedents give us information about speech acts, as in

(169):

(169) a. If you could just tell her, [I request you to tell her] I won't take up too much of her time.

b. If anybody asks for me, [I ask you to tell him] I will be right here.

Noh (2000: 204) cites another interesting example:

(170) [The bell is ringing. Jane knows that Mary does not want to see John]

Jane to Mary: If that's John, are you not here?

He proposes that the conditional has the following propositional form:

(171) If [that's John], [you want me to tell him you are not here]

Since the consequent is interrogative, it can be paraphrased as in (172):

(172) If that's John, do you want to tell me you are not here?

In the next example, the utterances of the consequents are attributed to the speaker himself:

(173) If it [= the money] isn't enough, thought Mitch, then it was nice to meet you fellas. If the pay is attractive, *then* we can discuss families and marriages and football and churches.

J. Grisham *The Firm*

That is, the conditionals in (173) can be paraphrased as in:

(174) If it isn't enough, then I tell them, "It was nice to meet you fellas." If the pay is attractive, then I tell them, "We can discuss families and marriages and football and churches."

Notice that in (173), the speaker is not actually performing speech acts in uttering the consequents; that is, he does not tell them, "Good-by!" or "Let's discuss families and marriages and etc." Contrast this with our familiar example:

(175) If I may say so, that's a crazy idea.

As we pointed out in section 3.1, the speaker in (175) actually asserts that it is a crazy idea.

A conditional like those cited by Noh is, we propose, analyzed as a speech act about a conditional, not as a conditional speech act. Van der

Auwera (1986: 03-203) says: 'While a speech act about a conditional is a speech act whose propositional content is a conditional, in a conditional speech act the protasis is asserted to be a sufficient condition for a speech act about the apodosis.' And he cites the following examples (See Van der Auwera (1986: 198-199)):

(176) A: If you inherit, will you invest?

B: Yes, if I inherit, I will invest.

(177) A: If you saw John, did you talk to him?

B: Yes, I saw him and I talked to him.

Or Yes, I talked to him.

In (176), A's utterance is a speech act about a conditional. So B can answer, "Yes," and affirm the entire conditional. In (177), however, this sort of answer is strange: B normally assents to the truth of both the antecedent and consequent, or just affirms the consequent. We normally answer the interrogative conditional (172), which is a paraphrase of 'If that's John, are you not here?' just as B does in (176), as in:

(178) A: It that's John, do you want me to tell him you are not here?

B: Yes, if that's John, I want you to tell him I'm not here.

(?Yes, that's John and I want you to tell him I'm not here.)

This shows that the examples in (165), (168), (170) and (173) are all speech acts about conditionals.

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