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Rejecting the Post-Westphalian Order:
Rapprochement with the Anarchistic Norm

Richard Miller*

【Abstract】

Contextualized in human history, the modern nation-state is a new phenomenon that is constantly evolving. International relations have been organized based on the concepts of international treaties that are over three centuries old that assured autonomy. After the end of the cold war, a move towards international cooperation with new terminology emerged to articulate some of the trends. However, the early 21st century has seen a rejection of the “New World Order”, with movements towards a return to an anarchistic, more traditional order. While the expectations of the liberal order were at its peak just after the collapse of the USSR and Francis Fukuyama declared “The End of History,” the events of September 11, 2001 marked a sharp turn in the world’s hegemonic power away from institutions and systems that provided transnational governance. This has meant a return to the original international order seen in the 19th and 20th century characterized by the repositioning of world powers. This paper will examine recent trends through the framework of several evolving international relations theories.

* Osaka Jogakuin University
1. Introduction

International relations (IR) is defined as the study of the interactions of state actors as they interact with each other (Jones, 1988). The discipline is therefore concerned with the actions of various nations, and what drives their domestic political agendas to behave the way that they do—after all political forces affect patterns of international trade, investment, and production (Keohane, 1986).

It is often argued in IR that the Westphalian system of government is about to end, which often signifies that each state possesses exclusive level of sovereignty over its territory. As contended by Osiander (2001), while analyzing contemporary international politics, this Westphalian system, with the concept of sovereignty at its core, has turned out largely as imaginary, and countries are trying to move ‘beyond Westphalia’. The hegemonic aspirations of the world superpowers have undermined this system quite significantly. Furthermore, as a result of industrialization, growing interdependence has continuously challenged the states’ capacity for self-reliance. This is accompanied by the proliferation of international institutions that are trying to influence trans-border politics. As a result, today’s international system is gradually moving away from the Westphalian model.

In IR, groupthink, sometimes referred to as entitativity, where groups are in an almost biological sense (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009) creates a situation where the group then becomes subjective to multilevel selection (Field, 2004). Creating cooperation amongst people, Turchin (2009) explains, is a necessity in order to inflict damage on another group. While that might seem obvious, he furthers that to achieve this collaboration, multilevel selection is a framework that helps explain the requirement of cooperation. As this is applicable at all levels the framework helps explain not only state nationalism, but also global order in an anarchistic world. But, within the confines of states and their dealing with others, it is important to remember that nationalism, “is not universal human dignity, but dignity for their group” (Fukuyama, 1992 p. 266).

The closer the group, the more the group becomes “high-entitative”, and the easier it is to direct it towards a goal (Brauer, Castano, Sacchi, 2009). Referring to wars, it is not easy to understand how they can motivate vast numbers of people. Peter Turchin (2009) explains that war (in particular WWI) in binding huge groups of unrelated people as a center of the “puzzle of ultra-sociality”. There is comfort and security with being in a group, and the perception of greater security in the international arena (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009). This becomes the human quality that nationalists often tap into when diplomacy as talking fails and the strengthening of the state, particularly in a realist realm. Oran Young (1989) explains that “wars are stimulated or even caused by the anarchical character of the state system” (p.216).

Again, in defining globalization, Keynes biographer Professor Robert Skidelsky (2005) uses Wolfe’s assertion that it is an “integration of economic activities, across borders, through markets.” Though integration of global development outcomes has seen dramatic improvements across the international economies, with the numbers of wealthy growing, while at the same time, “globalization, development analysts agree,
has been a bonanza for the poor” (Pinker, 2018, p. 92).

Transnational Corporations (TNC’s) have also grown in power and stature as independent bodies with growth rates exceedingly fast in the past three decades—the post WWII reopening of the world. Niall Ferguson (2009) referred to this as Globalization 2.0 with more equalization and what has been referred to as a flat world (Friedman, 2007). According to Santoro (2010), this has enhanced the need for those TNCs to consider their moral responsibility because “human rights transcend national laws” (p. 290). The problems he argues are that TNC’s have the problematic question of how to neither directly, nor-indirectly (through complacency) decide how to act. The first is relationships, while the second is potential effectiveness, and the third is the ability to absorb the financial obligations to act. While these views are from a benevolent perspective, the problems are the metrics used to determine each of those points. Therefore, the bigger issue then becomes what is moral, and what special interest group has access to the individual manipulation to their ends. The argument, then, is a greater need that is required to reign in the issues from a policy perspective.

2. Post-Westphalia and its Discontents

"Healthy discontent is the prelude to progress” - Mahatma Gandhi

According to Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2011), since 1648 the basic international laws have been shaped by the Westphalia system of government, forming “the normative structure or constitution of the modern world order” (p. 23). Therefore, as a critical part of the international order that has facilitated the growth and shaped international law: states are sovereign, and, no matter the size, equal and not to be tampered with internally (Baylis, Smith, & Owens 2011). Of course, that definition precluded non-Christian nations, and thereby vetoing their opportunities for gaining proper statehood and allowing them to be subjected to colonialism. Much of the early time of international order was what Krasner (1999) referred to as “organized hypocrisy” for the benefit of those with the power.

Contextualized, the system has proven to be highly innovative, efficient, and effective, though from a Euro-centric view. At the time it created a world that was unimaginable at the end of the 30 years’ war where there were French Catholics assisting Protestant Swedish envoys to get the concessions, as explained Henry Kissinger (1993). The concept at that time of the sovereign state not impinging on their neighbors was compared by Henry Kissinger (1993) to “a Swiss Alp in the desert”. The following centuries saw a competition for the ‘new world’, including the scramble for Africa in the 1885 Berlin Conference, and culminating at the expansion of pre-WWII when Japan’s Imperial ambitions continued in the ‘Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ were checked by war. While strong states, mostly European, operated within the Westphalia framework, the colonial impositions continued which was driven by conquest via technology that facilitated it (Hayes, Baldwin, & Cole, 1962; Allison, 2017).

Recently there have been threats to international order, and at the heart of the challenges to the Westphalia laws has been change that has in part been technologically
driven. This evolution, as Brian Arthur (2010) points out, all technology is interconnected and cannot occur without that which preceded. Technology has continued to add complexity to international relations as Transnational Corporations and Organizations have grown and become their own force (Kaletsky, 2010). In 1996, John Perry Barlow highlighted the movement change through technology with “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”, which he declared that cyberspace overrode the state. So, it is no surprise that companies that grew out of doing business there were the latest and quickly became the biggest disrupter (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2018). The results have been power shifts and globalization creating actors that have ramifications to sovereignty and to the ideals that were included in the Westphalia framework.

Solutions to implement the suggestions by Santoro have been made in a variety of ways, but generally imply larger government. Peter Drucker (1993) explains that the decline of the nation-state has been decades in the making, weakening the institutions to the point where what he calls transnational agencies (p.142). He continues to explain that the transnational agencies are necessary to combat important issues, like the environment, terrorism, and arms control (pp. 145-8). More recently, the arguments go further with area such as economic ones, as French President Sarkozy in 2010 at Davos advocated for “an unprecedented leap toward global government” (p. 332), and with that a greater governance in all forms. The movements seem to have governance in mind, but the structure of it remains uncertain. Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl (2015) argue that the Post-Westphalia order remains fragmented, with either a constitutionally organized international order, or an authoritarian one that international organizations will need to work under. The authors then conceptualize the two orders, with a scale that follows: democratic, partially democratic, hybrid, partially autocratic, and autocratic.

Articulated earlier, the biggest recent interrupter globally, of course, has been technology driven by the internet as the main facilitator of the free flow of ideas that have allowed the volume of ideas to flow. But, as explained by Tapscott and Tapscott (2018), the results for democracy have been mixed (p. 212). However, one way for TNC’s and democratic institutions themselves, is through the market, via blockchain advancements. According to Tapscott and Tapscott (2018), it could change the level of financial transparency with the ability—through smart contracts—to tie payments to performance and even facilitate transparent elections. Thus, through the market could result in a freer society and more responsibility directed to the financial end of TNC’s (and further negate a possibility of international authoritarianism).

Conversely, it is an authoritarian regime that has had the most effective pushback against technology in order to push their state autonomy back towards the Westphalian traditions. A trend towards that is found in China, where the realist perspective was implemented by the authoritarian regime (Pinker, 2018), making it rank the “worst in the world for internet freedom”, according to the Financial Times (Feng, 2017). The results are that those TNCs that did not follow Beijing’s wishes were simply shut out of the domestic market (something that is jarring to anyone transiting in a Chinese airport without WeChat and other “China friendly” apps).
3. Historical Perspectives on Nationalism in International Relations

Nationalism, the “collective group identity that passionately binds diverse individuals into a people…with the nation the highest affiliation” (Jones, 1988, p. 409), tends to direct actions and interactions of state actors. While it seemed that nationalism was waning after the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift since that time away from the liberal international order. So, as nationalism is revived, it is important to take note of it in all of its forms, as it leads to different reactions in diplomacy, making its relevance critical in the study of IR.

As argued by Heiskanen (2019), the ontology of modern international relations is inherently dependent on nationalism, even when it appears to remain ineffective and absent. Different aspects of nationalism are rooted in the concept of sovereignty. Eventually, these act as the ontological cornerstone of modern IR, though many people believe that nationalism becomes important only when the international order is in crisis.

Group cooperation in various forms, evolving from family units and tribalism to survive has been omnipotent for the continuation of the species. Francis Fukuyama (1992) explains that nationalism is relatively new because it replaces “lordship and bondage with mutual and equal recognition” (p. 266). The dangers of irrational growth of nationalism are exacerbated when populism ensures that mobilization of the nation takes place at the behest of mass hysteria, which was prominent at the end of the monarchies. In his book *Mobs, Manias and Hysteria*, Gustave Le Bon (1895/2014) explains that nationalism was harnessed for political gains from the time of the French Revolution, but later refined by the Spanish in 1873, where “Long live the federal republic” became the rallying cry that people addressed each other in the streets (p. 87).

Disseminating ideas to as wide an audience as possible has always (and continues) been important to successful propaganda implementation. One of the more egregious examples was what grew out of post-WWI Germany as the country was still dealing with the reparations and punishments that were forced upon it and the aptly named “National Socialists” who took advantage of the domestic situation to grab power. To illustrate how nationalism is derived from media, Sheldon Wolin (2008) begins the preview of his book *Democracy Incorporated* by describing the scenes from Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film ‘The Triumph of the Will’ as an example of technology harnessed towards moving public opinion towards nationalism.

Utilizing modern technology for mass manipulations were part of what Edward Barneys wrote in his 1928 book *Propaganda*, which he referred to as “new propaganda”, with changes that incorporated (motion picture technology) quite differently from two decades earlier in allowing for easier shaping mass psychology and creating situations that swayed entire populations. Collective groupthink continues as seen in the post-9/11 time period which offered anecdotal evidence with slogans that were on cars and t-shirts stating: “United We Stand” (Brauer, Castano, & Sacchi, 2009), and more recently with social media worldwide, so the trend continues towards the risk of more use of propaganda furthering nationalist agendas.
Recent changes in many countries, including an inward-looking America have shown the changes to earlier assumptions. As Kiseleva (2009) put it a decade ago, “Now nationalism is on the rise. It can stir up a lot of negative feelings across many nations and roll over national boundaries causing conflict and strife.” Therefore, the author contends that answers to nationalism might be to look back at realism for insight on policy to deal with and mitigate the issues. While talking with Niall Ferguson, Henry Kissinger recently stated that the United States and China are now at the foothills of a war—with terrible consequences should tensions not be lowered (Chandler & Elegant, 2019).

Often, government use of nationalism comes after misuse of regulation, driving more and further interventions. As Von Mises in Human Action (p. 823) explains: “Aggressive nationalism is the necessary derivative of the policies of interventionism and national planning”. After decades of governmental meddling in markets and all areas of societies, the shift towards more nationalism may be the result of several factors.

There are of course dangers to world peace, as nationalism tends to less liberal order and a move back to a realist view of international relations. Almost three decades after his seminal work, Francis Fukuyama now fears that it also is on the rise and is leading to less democracy (Tharoor, 2018). All of which leans towards the worst kind of diplomacy, as it is what Walter Jones (1988) claims: “a potent factor in the causal chain to war” (p. 410).

On the other hand, whether the benign sounding “post-modern nationalism” that some have labeled “Canadian nationalism”, as a self-preservation against America (Thomas 2018), or more radical forms such as in America today, it does not necessarily lead to conflict. This is seen in numerous examples, such as Hayek’s self-generating regimes which are likely to develop and then work in collaboration, explains Orin (1989), where spontaneous cooperation likely emerges (pp. 50-1). Thus, many of the international organizations have materialized to work together towards mutually beneficial ends in open-to-entry regimes (Orin, 1989, p. 51).

4. Post-WW2 Globalization & Human Development

The year 2020 marks three quarters of a century since the end of WWII and the rebirth of globalization, after a pause that began with WWI (Ferguson 2005). Since that time, the world has done very well economically and the overall betterment of humanity continues, in particular global development. This is the era that has been referred to as “development” because of the dramatic economic growth after the war. Development studies, according to Sachs (2009), was born at the end of WWII, as a way of “…preparation of blueprints for the postwar reconstruction of eastern and southern Europe” (p. 5).

For this time of growth Skidelsky (2009) marks 1951 as the start of the “Golden Age” of development, with the end in 1973 (just after Bretton Woods had collapsed) (pp. 116-126). A similar time frame, 1945–1975, Sachs (2009), while quoting Steven Marglin, calls it “the golden age of capitalism”. However, even after the end of that
period (early 1970s) until 2018, according to the World Bank, global GDP has gone up six times (from 14 trillion to 84 trillion) (worldbank.org). This achievement is more dramatic when juxtaposed with other advances in humanity, as the population today is estimated at 7.75 billion, but stood at 2.3 billion at the end of WWII. From 1973 the population had not quite doubled (to about half of what it is today) to just under 4 billion (Emmott, 2013).

In other words, at the time when population grew exponentially, economies grew at an even faster rate, creating what Matt Ridley (2010) calls “affluence for all”. This is because “The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better” (p.15) with the aggregate poverty rates continuing to decline, even with the exponential increase in human population. Poverty has been reduced in the previous 50 years more than in the last 500 years (Ridley 2010), or as Steven Pinker (2018) put it during that time “the majority of the human race has become much better off” (p. 113).

One of the detracting arguments to global development is that inequalities continue to exist, and there are a number of issues that continue to dog different parts of societies. Most notably the issue of inequality, which has been pointed to as a problem for the current world. Thomas Piketty (2017) published his long research project that looked at inequalities from the economic perspective in his book *Capital*, with the results showing that various inequalities between rich and poor exist. Sachs (2009) contends that there have been failures with “…billions of people excluded from globalization by globalization” (p. 15). As mentioned by David Landes, “The gap in wealth and health that separates rich and poor is the greatest single problem and danger confronting the twenty-first century” (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007, p. 1).

Yet the counter to that is that even the poorest countries today have improved the living standards of most of their citizens, as the overall index of metrics continue to get better, with overall rising standards. An example is the poorest country in the world, Burundi, with a level of poverty that is as bad as the world gets (Ventura 2019). As one enters the country there are options that are open to anyone, from Wi-Fi to high end coffee (Miller, 2019). While the majority of the population lives at the low end of the international scale, the absolute poverty of starvation has been largely reduced (though not eliminated) as the number of starving has declined and the level of education has grown (Hurst, 2016).

One metric that is used by economists to measure inequality is with the Gini coefficient. “At zero, people all earn the same thing. At 100, the rich get all the income” (Bonner & Rajiva, 2007 p. 199). However, not all economists prefer it, as Thomas Piketty (2017) calls the measurement “synthetic… mix very different things, such as inequality with respect to labor and capital”. Instead, he tries to contrast “things as precisely as possible” (p. 243). Of course, Von Mises (1963) points out: “Economics deals with real man, weak and subject to error as he is, not with ideal beings, omniscient and perfect as only gods could be” (p. 97). So, according to some mainstream economists, there is a gulf between the rich and the poor that they are trying to measure and explain, but overall the majority are much better off.

While there are inequalities, when measuring global success, an area that helps
to illustrate overall positive changes that have occurred since renewed globalization and development, is the “theory of time-prices” (Maher, 2019). That is the working time it takes to purchase something, which allows for greater consumption if the overall working time to buy something drops (Maher, 2019, Tupy, 2019). The assertion is that more or less universally “time-prices have plunged nearly 65% since 1980” (Maher, 2019), with air conditioners falling 97% since the development era began (Hammond & Pooley, 2019). This is because air conditioners took the average blue-collar worker 203 hours to buy 5,500 BTU’s, but only 5.56 hours today. George Gilder (2019) points out that “Tupy and Pooley estimate that since 1980, while the world’s population increased 71%, time-prices dropped 72%”.

Von Mises (1963) in Human Action noted, “What those people who ask for equality have in mind is always an increase in their own power to consume” (p. 840). Economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) states that “What is needed are policies for sustainable, equitable, and democratic growth. This is the reason for development. Development is not about helping a few people get rich or creating a handful of pointless industries that only benefit the country's elite” (pp. 251-2). It is hard to argue with that statement, the problem is that many mainstream economists argue for more regulation and greater intervention, hampering free choice. More, not less, regulation towards what von Mises (1963) explains, “Laissez faire means: Let the common man choose and act; do not force him to yield to a dictator” (p.732). To do otherwise is, to paraphrase the motivational psychologist Dr. Dennis Waitley (1984), “that which we fear most, we ourselves bring to pass”—in other words unfair markets with restricted access to wealth creation and governments creating protection for those in power.

5. Power in International Politics: Insights from evolutionary biology

Robert Keohane (1986) started his book “World politics today is a matter of life and death” (p. 1), and therefore understanding how it is structured is crucial. There is an interesting joke that illustrates power dynamics in human interaction: The golden rule is that those who have the gold make the rules. So, to explain that in an international sense, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) begin their article, “The concept of power is central to international relations” and they then go on to explain the importance of how that takes place in a system of international anarchy. Within the international relations schools of thought, two contrasting theories have emerged that center on how states gain and retain power: the hard approach contrasted with the soft approach. By looking at evolutionary biology there are clues as to why both approaches have some validity.

Robert Keohane (1986) explains that realist power is the coercive power or hard power (force) that a state actor uses to get what it desires. And, much of the current political lines can be explained in that way. As a case in point, Diamond (1997) explains the raw power of the Spanish to reshape the former vast empires that once ruled into the political lines of today. Meredith (2013) shows a more recent example can be shown with the 1885 Berlin Conference that reshaped Africa where many traditional linguistic and tribal boundaries were ignored as the continent was divided. Throughout the ages,
as argued by the realists, power plays a vital role in realizing the dynamics of war and peace, as well as determines the relations among different political communities (Schmidt, 2007). Hence, according to John Mearsheimer, “calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 43).

The concept of realist power has varying degrees of coerciveness with what Waltz (1999) and Carr (1964, in Barnett & Duvall, 2005) articulated as ‘hard power’ with an explanation for how the international system balances itself through self-interested actions. Realists put international relations into different power organizations, with the interactions that are contingent upon how the interactions proceed. This is the stronger, at the expense of the weaker, force through their agendas. While this “Darwin effect” has been invoked to explain the survival of the fittest, and as an excuse or justification for various types of aggressive behavior (De Waal (2009) likens it to the Gordon Gekko character from the film Wall Street, where the strong devour the weak), yet the former USSR is an example of the unsustainability of a hard power system. As opined by Wagner (2014), soft power is the more efficient and effective concept in today’s international politics due to its sustainability and endurance, rather than the hard power, which is less useful today.

Again, evolutionary biology helps to explain why cooperation works, and De Wall (2009) calls it an evolutionary empathy, while Steven Pinker (2018) refers to it as ‘our better angels’, and which he gives credit for humans being able to work together that leads to societies that function and interact with other societies. The lesson behind those are summoned up by Jared Diamond (1991) who explains (in The Third Chimpanzee) why cooperation is important, and how there is a connection between societies that survive and continue and those that do not. This important distinction is that there are the selfish and uncooperative groups that perish. In a later work, Diamond (2005) shows how societies can collapse when they try and fail to dominate others, with one example of the Vikings who died off after attempting to dominate (rather than work with) local indigenous communities. Boehm and Flack (2010) explain the importance of cooperation and trade in a slow timescale tends to grow networks as well as lower conflict, all of which helps to ensure survival. Ridley (2011) argues that conversely, societies that move from cooperation and trade regress, with the dramatic example of the natives of Tasmania who, after stopping all contact with the Australian continent moved dramatically backward in a few generations.

One way to try and bridge the views of different viewpoints of analyzing IR situations is through a taxonomy by Barnett and Duvall (2005), with four areas of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. These are transmitted through the following four: specific/direct or diffuse/indirect from which Barnett and Duvall created a grid referring to as a taxonomy in order to classify the ways that power plays out in international relations and what they suggest as “see power’s multiple forms” (p.43). However, traditional Realist approaches as there are at present 196 countries that are listed with the UN, and with it there are curious anomalies with those that are quite powerful in the sense of persuasiveness, yet lacking military might. While Canada falls under the umbrella of America, New Zealand is a better example of a
country with a limited military, hard power, and one that is far more persuasive in its abilities that are what Joseph Nye (2005) called ‘Soft Power’ which can be quite legitimate as seen in those two examples.

Both forms of persuasive (hard and soft) behavior are alive within international relations to varying degrees, and there tends to be swings towards harder and softer approaches. David Brooks (2007) uses evolutionary biology to show the selfish brutish Hobbesian view of human nature as what drives social behavior towards self-preservation and dominance. De Waal (2009) counters this conservative rightwing viewpoint as something that is articulated as a reason for less government and regulation, and free-market economies as a “half-truth” (p. 204-5). This leaves open the other half, and that is cooperation as necessary for survival.

6. Case Study: Transformation of the GME & The Bush Doctrine

The Greater Middle East (GME) is a geo-political term defined by Ottaway, Marina, and Thomas (2004) at the Carnegie Endowment to explain Bush’s G-8 meeting agenda that year. It is the area “including not only the Arab world but also Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey” (Ottaway, Marina, & Thomas, 2004). The overriding connection within the parameters of the GME is that it is the birthplace of three (of the five) main religions of the world, with the Islamic faith by far the region’s biggest; ‘so it should have been more peaceful’, Lebanon’s Middle East Time’s Claude Salhani (2009, p. 171) points out. In recent history it has been anything but peaceful, and the most recent American foreign policy doctrine, the Bush Doctrine, has proven to be controversial at best, and a failure at worst (Renshon, 2007; Salhani, 2009; Forte 2012).

September 11 is a watershed day for Americans after the 2001 terrorist attacks, and there was much speculation as to the importance of the day. The emergency phone number in America (911) seemed to be the main focus for many commentators. However, for the Islamist terrorists the day was symbolic because the Battle of Vienna took place on the day that ended the Muslim army’s advancement in Europe—something that is well remembered within the region (Carter, 1985; Armstrong, 2001).

Thus, a continuation of a long antagonistic relationship between the Islamic world and the West including the Crusaders going into the Middle East, something that is remembered throughout the region (Armstrong, 2001; Carter, 1985). While the Crusades may not have lasting success, much of the region was later subjugated, and therefore “the region’s politics, culture, and economy have been influenced by external powers of the western world” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.59).

The divides with Islam run deep as there are two competing major sects: the Shia and Sunni, which started with the Battle of Karbala on October 10, 680 (Armstrong, 2001). The Pew Research Center (2012) found that “in most countries at least 40% of the majority Sunnis do not accept Shias as legitimate followers of the Islamic faith, with those in the GME “most keenly aware” of differences. This sectarian divide has been a major factor in the region’s divisions, with the 1979 Iranian Revolution a watershed moment, and a sticking point to this day with not only other Sunnis but America (Carter, 1985; Haberman, 2020). Kicking out western influence and
then taking 52 American hostages still resonates in the United States as seen with the January 2020 Trump threat to bomb 52 sites in Iran, including cultural ones, if needed (Haberman 2020).

For those realists in power such as Richard Haas, American roles in policing the world were becoming more important and needed to be increased “to an imperial level” in 2000 (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 66). Haas (2017) later states that the United Nations propelled this with the “Responsibility to protect” in 2005. This he explains is important for America to remain active in order to prevent another Rwanda (pp. 114-116).

Yet, the objectives of the world’s only superpower in Iraq were not being met, which created a “puzzle in realist theory” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 65). In 2004, the United States was the monopolistic power in the world, with 65% of total world military power (Aminch and Houweling, 2007, p. 62), and for realist power that meant it should achieve its objectives quickly and efficiently, but it is clearly not working for the United States. There are, however, continuing arguments in favor of the realist perspective as a solution for the region. Kenneth Waltz (2012) argues in *Foreign Affairs* that only by having a nuclear-armed Iran will the region gain a balance of power (with Israel being the other half of the equation), as he dismisses the idea that there will be a nuclear arms race. He cites India and Pakistan as the example to follow as those two states act as rational powers.

A recent example of failure in Iraq is evident with the January 2020 resolution of the Iraqi government to ask US forces to leave the country (Berger, 2020). Aminch and Houweling (2007) would like to suggest that Realists fail to recognize the micro-level foundation of politics (p. 69), and that there is no “homo-politicus” (p.70) to explain states behavior. Ironically, the authors use the example of owners of a firm enriching themselves as they bankrupt a company—this was something former US president Donald Trump was personally successful in his private business in Atlantic City as his companies went bankrupt (Johnson, 2017; O’Brian, 2004).

The other theory is classical liberal theory as applied to the Middle East (particularly in Locke’s tradition), which requires that all areas should be opened to maximize efficiency and become molded into the Wilsonian ideal (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.73). The problem is that it is the self-interests that seemed to be driving an amnesic US foreign policy.

The region has had a long and varied history (Armstrong, 2001; Carter, 1985) but according to Salhani (2009), much of American foreign policy tends to ignore the lessons of history when it comes to the Middle East. As history tends to repeat itself more often than we care to remember, or admit, “… nor can history be ignored as the George W. Bush administration tried to do” (Salhani, 2009, p. 23). Though, for the US, one part of the liberalism agenda is to ensure that America is on the “Right side of history” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.74). This from the country with collective amnesia and the attitude of many decision makers that “We are history’s actors and you, all of you, will be left to study what we do” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p. 66). Bush himself was clearly not concerned about history when asked about how history might
judge him when he stated, “We won’t know. We will all be dead” (Hybel & Kaufman, 2006, p. 127).

**Bush Doctrine in the Middle East**

The term the “Bush Doctrine” was used by the conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer in June of 2001, just a half year into the presidency, describing the inward looking American foreign policy (Krauthammer, 2001, Renshon, 2009). This doctrine was greatly expanded after the 2001 attacks, and in 2007 (well into the second term of Bush) (Renshon, 2009). The actual implementation of this doctrine took the surprising form of a "preventative war--a war to stop a war. Furthermore, Schlesinger notes that the fact that Bush administration accomplished this "without igniting a national debate shows remarkable leadership skills."(Woodward, 2006, p. 371). However, according to Heisbourg (2003), this concept of preventive war was not what Bush believed. Rather, it is the complete opposite of the prevalent understanding of Bush Doctrine that assumes that America can use its force for fulfilling its objectives. This Bush Doctrine has significantly influenced the strategic interests of the U.S. allies, as due to the emphasis on preemption and prevention, the U.S. has departed from the strategies of its allies.

The US in the Middle East today is a crowded and difficult place to manage and derived from the 9/11 attacks in 2001. According to Renshon (2007), the later refined Bush Doctrine was a pushback that had five different objectives: American preeminence, assertive realism, strategic/stand apart alliances, new internationalism, and democratic transformation (pp. 14-21). It was the September 20th, 2001 Bush speech that gave the Bush doctrine direction with the promise to go to war with terrorism and the beginning of the next phase of the Bush Doctrine (Renshon, 2007).

The recent adventurism that the Trump administration in Iraq against the Iranian general Soleimani shows a continuation of the doctrine —further justifying Schlesinger’s assessment as witnessed with recent actions within Iraq have proven that there are ongoing failures. The dramatic December 2019 siege of the US Embassy in Bagdad illustrate the ongoing influence of the Shiite backed Iranian forces in the country (Berger, 2020; Haberman, 2020).

The unintended consequences of continuous conflict (‘War on Terror’) have been substantial, including the dark war that took place around the GME (Forte, 2012). Iraq is the most prominent example of interventionism under the guise of the Bush Doctrine in the GME. Successive presidents, Obama and Trump, have both continued the policies to varying degrees. Obama was directly involved in the Libyan ousting of Ghaddafi in 2011 in Sirte which has led to a failed state (Forte, 2012; Saleh & England, 2019).

One of the major problems has been the continuing “puzzle of how individual interests become aggregated into the liberal national interest” (Aminch & Houweling, 2007, p.79). Russ Baker (2009) has made a case that both of the Iraq invasions were driven by the Bush family profits at the direction of the 41st and 43rd presidents. However, the most egregious examples may be found in the 45th president, Trump, who has been referred to by some psychologists as narcissistic (McClain, 2016). Prior to
getting elected, there were comparisons with Trump’s personal style and fascist leaders Hitler and Mussolini (McClain, 2016, pp. 75-79). He has influence on the entire social fabric of America (Singer, 2016, pp. 25-33), with dysfunction and narcissism. The Trump administration has continued to work within a dysfunctional framework, brought on from the top, according to Michael Wolf (2018).

The condition of America turning in while expanding its preemptive behavior has been extremely destabilizing for the Middle East. While it was a continuation of the policies that were implemented well before the Bush Doctrine, it was clearly refined by it. The traditional IR framework of liberalism and realist theories are helpful in explaining some of the failures of American policy in the GME (Aminch & Houweling, 2007), and a better approach needs to be considered, as decades of failure have proven. In Human Action, Ludwig von Mises explained that, “To defeat the aggressors is not enough to make peace durable. The main thing is to discard the ideology that generates war” (p. 832).

Can’t we all get along?

Ever since humans have organized themselves into communities their success rates have increased, as they are by far the most dominant species on the planet. This is largely a result of organizing, first as groups, then societies that form as cultures develop. While human social evolution has seemed quite long, it is a recent advancement, and it is worthwhile to view the large international organizations through the lens of historical developments from different interdisciplinary vantage points to try and comprehend current events.

Interdisciplinary studies have traditionally proven fertile grounds for collaboration between ideas (Ridley, 2010), so combining academic disciplines often creates unique perspectives. One example is when Dugger (1984) puts forth a progressive theory of evolution creating a framework around the theorists Thorstein Veblen and Peter Kropotkin to gain understanding of alternatives to social Darwinism. Another is deep-seated culture and human nature applied anthropologically to gain insight to anarchy by Snyder (2002). With those concepts as a backdrop, the question of whether the world is heading towards anarchy and a new international Post-Westphalia order, or reverting to the norm is explored.

Evolutionary biology helps to explain what Dugger (1984) calls the dichotomy of selfishness and competition when working together for group survival. While Pinker (2018) likens the phenomena of overall unselfishness as “our better angels”, with the selfish gene being overrated—because at the group level it is often suppressed. Veblen’s “law” describes the importance of cooperation because “…mutual aid is as much a law of animal life as mutual struggle” (Veblen as quoted in Dugger, 1984), as it leads to greater survival rates and group success. Applied to international relations, this helps explain how there are seemingly altruistic actions, as well as coming together to coordinate financial and other cooperative ventures, within the confines of the state instead of Darwinism on the individual level. Following a long history where states found cooperation, rather than only working on selfish means, the Treaty of Westphalia
organized a cooperative agreement. Later, the Vienna Congress was another that allowed for a peaceful Europe for almost a century (Kissinger, 1994, p. 2001).

Snyder (2002) believes that culture contributes to change, and “There is no reason to believe that future anarchical systems will be limited only to the patterns observed in the past” (p. 11). Snyder (2002) defines culture (following Clifford Geertz) as “a system of symbols that creates meaning with a social group”. Though not all forms were peaceful, as “…anthropologists find the frequency and intensity of war correlate with a generalized culture of mistrust, fear, and harshness in social relationships” (Snyder, 2002, p. 29).

Dugger (1984) explains that Veblen distinguished the move from savagery (individual striving to survive) to barbarism (groups fighting other groups in anarchy), which was the growth of civilizations and organized political systems. This movement was facilitated by the growth of the family unit, and concepts of private property – and therefore the cultural organization. This facilitated “An economic surplus” (Dugger, 1984, p. 979) as it gave rise to the state functioning as a constitutional authority, allowing for economy and wealth accumulation. Thus, a bigger group, the state benefits the most from cooperative effects. Dugger (1984) makes the case that the larger the group, the more important cooperation is for evolution. So, following the collapse of the Roman Empire, groups were self-organized into villages, later city states, and finally states—leading to further stability and ultimately the success seen today (Dugger, 1984) in an anarchist system.

So much of international relations (IR) theory at times can seem academic and often in the realm of theory without grounding in the real world: the debate between Nozick and Rawls as “two bookends of theory” is an example (Schaefer, 2008). In contrast, the frequently-used IR term ‘anarchy’ brings forth images of lawlessness and a breakdown of social norms. In mid-2019 as Hong Kong descended into street battles between protesters and police, an op-ed in the South China Morning Post described the breakdown of “…violent street clashes. The sheer senselessness of it all is truly scary” (Fong, 2019). This anarchy was where mobs of anarchists destroyed the MTR (the commuter train) and vandalized shopping malls of Yuen Long and Sha Tin. The deeper epistemological roots of the term is: ‘without a central authority’. Within those confines of a definition, the term anarchy fits the current world order that does not have an overriding central authority (Yau, 2019).

Veblen found that cooperation and the standardization of a common culture meant that the governments were then under greater scrutiny (Dugger, 1984). Therefore, coercion into organizations that are too large does not always work, as Drucker (1993) calls mega-states that forcibly take over smaller ones as they grow (with Nazi Germany and the USSR as examples), “a total failure” (p. 131). It was, after all, partly through the failure of religious based organization that led to the rise of the modern state (Kissinger 2001) after a treaty to end the European religious wars in the towns of Osnabruck and Munster in modern day Germany.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia “emerged the novel principle that all independent sovereign states, regardless of size, were essentially equal”. With the result
of a greatly diminished church, “the pope could no longer speak with spiritual authority to all the rulers” (Hays, Baldwin & Cole 1962, p. 404). Kissinger (1993) contends that the European state system, arising out of Westphalia in 1648 was the start of balance of power politics after the collapse into ashes of universal empire. The balance of power of the states meant the “goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation” (Kissinger, 1993, p. 21). This did lead to stability, though later international systems – the Congress of Vienna and the post WWII American system were “the most stable” (Kissinger, 1993, p. 27).

Huntington (1996) explains that “The international system was the Western Westphalian system of ‘civilized’ nation states and the colonial territories they controlled” (p. 52). The result is that the anarchy metaphor is employed to “provide an image of nation-states that consider every option available to them and make choices independently in order to maximize their own returns” (Stein, 1986 p.116).

Bellamy and Williams pinpoint a 1999 speech by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair that ushered in the “Post-Westphalia era” (2010, p. 37). It was likely much earlier with the end of WWI and the attempt of the League of Nations “…resembled an international government…” though was different in reality (Hayes, Baldwin & Cole, 1962, p.733). The League’s Covenant kept the sovereign state, while at the same time moving away from anarchy with sanctions that included both military and economic actions (Dunne, 2011). The great war (WWI) breakdown of the Congress of Vienna, which abruptly halted globalization up to that point, resulted in a post-war world that demanded international order (Kissinger, 1995). Reflected in that was the Wilsonian attempt at governance through the League of Nations. Of the 12 points, most were looking towards a world of cooperation. The failure of the League was assured when even Wilson’s own government did not approve America’s involvement (Dunne, 2011; Kissinger, 1995), and it took another world war, and then a bipolar world to restart the post-Westphalian liberalism.

7. Conclusion

The WWII post-war order and the pushback against the USSR that led to the main actors, as Allison (2017) stated: “the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (to provide basic global economic order); The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the US-Japan alliance (to ensure Japan and Europe were deeply integrated into the campaign against the Soviet Union); and the United Nations —— all as building blocks of a global order they sought to construct, floor by floor over decades” (p. 205). The last decade of the 20th century saw dramatic changes in the old-world order of bipolarity. The crumbling of the USSR left many with the impression that the liberal order had triumphed (Fukuyama, 1992). However, the realist perspective within the world has reaffirmed its place with its distinctive head again as the rise of China, a more assertive Russia along with an America that is pulling back, creating a much more multi-polar world that is far from the ‘New World Order’ and the centralized authority that many conspiracy theorists had feared.
With the end of the Cold War that saw a change in a bipolar hegemonic system, a change in international relations took place with liberalism appearing to prevail (Dunne, 2011; Kissinger, 2001; Fukuyama, 1992). The term “New World Order” was used to encapsulate the times, with Fukuyama (1992) calling the rise of liberalism “the end of history”. With it a move of international organizations towards one (of several) forms of “Post-Westphalia”, ranging from what Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl (2015) ranked between constitutionalism and authoritarianism.

Understanding the reality (the ‘is) and theory (‘ought’), according Snyder (2002), should be central to international relations scholarship (p. 41) rather than where it often is: “at the level of abstract philosophy and visceral morality” (p. 9). Thayer (2004) states that the “evolutionary theory allows international relations scholars to generate insights into specific issues in the discipline” (p.11) and “the causes of war and ethnic conflict…” (p. 13). So, with a lessening of the influences of international systems and a move away from cooperation, there is a possibility that international relations are moving towards a post-post Westphalian world. Thus, continued anarchy has been the trend (Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl, 2015), as international regimes continue to transform and reduce cooperation, strengthening a move back towards an anarchistic international order.
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